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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Clarence Kendall Cook, Petitioner, 
v. 
State of South Carolina, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000366 
Appeal From Marlboro County 

Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27596 

Submitted October 15, 2015 – Filed December 9, 2015 

REVERSED 
Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, 
for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson , of Columbia, 
and Assistant Attorney General Joshua L. Thomas, of 
Greenwood, for Respondent.
JUSTICE BEATTY: A grand jury indicted Clarence Kendall Cook for 
murder, unlawful possession of a pistol, and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime.  After a jury trial, Cook was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 
crime.  Cook filed a post-conviction relief ("PCR") application, which was 
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dismissed after a hearing.  Following the dismissal of his PCR application, Cook 
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 
110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). We granted certiorari to determine whether the trial 
court erred in charging the jury with the lesser-included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter. We reverse.
I. Factual/Procedural History 
At the time of the incident that gave rise to this appeal, Cook and Charles 
Hayes ("Victim") lived in the Marlboro Court apartment complex in Marlboro 
County. Cook, who lived in the apartment above Victim, contended that Victim
had constantly been berating him, calling Cook, inter alia, a "snitch" for testifying 
in a murder trial against an individual tied to Victim as well as for telling their 
landlord that Victim was allegedly selling drugs out of his apartment.     
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on June 10, 2010, Cook, his girlfriend, and his 
cousin were on their way to the grocery store when Cook and Victim exchanged 
the following text messages: 
Victim:  "You f*** n***a I herd u being sh*t about me n***a and about the 
bullsh*t that going on around here. I don't have sh*t to do with it, so 
keep my name out your mouth." 
Cook: "U aint sh*t 2 b talkn bout I dnt care bout yal or wat u movn I dnt 
want u it aint me no words 4 u or los life goes on." 
Victim:  "N***a f*** u."
Cook: "Lol."
At approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening, the three returned to the apartment 
complex to find Victim sitting outside on the porch.  As they walked upstairs, 
Victim made a series of threatening comments directed at Cook echoing similar 
sentiments from the text messages he sent earlier that day.  According to Cook, 
Victim was saying "you ain't nothin' but a snitch ass p***y n***a."; "I can get that 
n***a touched"; and, "look at him and his b*tch."  While Cook admitted Victim's
last comment was "enough to really strike [him] in [his] heart," Cook continued up 
the stairs without saying anything to Victim. 
13 

  
Once inside the apartment, Cook ate some watermelon, placed the 
watermelon rinds inside a plastic bag, grabbed his gun from under the couch, and 
went downstairs to discard the bag. According to Cook, once downstairs, he did 
not have a chance to get to the dumpster because Victim was approaching him, 
grimacing and threatening to shoot him in "broad daylight."  Cook stated Victim 
had one of his hands in his back pocket, acting as if he had a gun and was going to 
pull it out and shoot Cook at any moment.1  At this time, Victim's nephew, 
Terrance Bridges, was approaching Cook in the opposite direction as if he was 
about to "jump" him.  Cook and Victim then exchanged the following words: 
 
Victim: "You f*** n***a. You ain't nothing but a snitch." 
 
Cook:  "Who you callin' a f*** n***a?" 
 
Victim: "You." 
 
Cook:  "What?" 
 
Cook said he tried to keep walking down the sidewalk, but Victim kept cutting him 
off. According to Cook, Victim continued to approach Cook huffing, grimacing, 
and threatening to kill him.  At that point, Cook said "the dude was coming up" and 
"before I knew it, I fired a shot." Cook said he then fired a second shot and ran.  
Both shots struck Victim in the face.  When asked why he fired the second shot, 
Cook replied "to make sure he was gone."  In his oral statement, Cook further 
explained: "I was terrified." "I didn't even sit there for a second.  As soon as I saw 
him reaching I just shot."  "I wasn't taking any chances."  "It was either me or him, 
man, it really was." 
 
Bridges testified he saw Victim get up and walk over to Cook.  He said 
"from there on they were just talking real softly."  He stated he "could hardly tell it 
was an argument." Then Cook stepped back, pulled out a gun and shot Victim.  
According to Bridges, Cook then walked over Victim, did some kind of gesture, 
shot Victim again, and ran. 
 
                                        
 
1 A gun was never found on Victim.   
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Victim's girlfriend, Kim Brown, was also outside at the time of the incident.  
At trial, Brown testified that once Cook came downstairs she saw Victim approach 
Cook and say "keep my name out of all this mess y'all got going on out here.  I 
don't have nothing to do with that."  The next thing she heard was a gunshot.  After 
seeing Victim fall to the ground, Brown testified she saw Cook walk over Victim
and shoot him again.  According to Brown, Cook then dropped the bag and ran.   
A grand jury indicted Cook for murder, unlawful possession of a pistol, and 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  At trial, Cook 
claimed self-defense.  At the close of the State's case, the State withdrew the 
unlawful possession of a pistol charge. At the close of the defense, the trial court, 
upon the State's request, and over Cook's objection, instructed the jury on the law 
of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.2  After deliberations, the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter and guilty of possession 
of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  The trial court sentenced 
Cook to twenty years' imprisonment and a consecutive, five-year sentence for 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  
Cook filed a PCR application. After a hearing, the PCR judge denied relief 
and dismissed Cook's application.  Cook then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
asserting the PCR judge erred in finding Cook was not entitled to a direct appeal 
pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). We granted the 
petition and directed the parties to brief the issue of whether the trial court erred in 
charging the jury with the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter when 
there was no evidence of the element of sudden heat of passion required for 
voluntary manslaughter. 
II. Standard of Review 
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."  
State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006).  "An appellate court 
will not reverse the trial judge's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of 
discretion."  State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 270, 721 S.E.2d 413, 421-22 
(2011). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an
2 Curiously, even though the State requested a voluntary manslaughter charge, in 
its closing argument, the State said: "Use your common sense.  This is murder.  It 
is not self-defense. It is not manslaughter it is murder."  
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error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary 
support." Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000).  "The 
trial court must determine the law to be charged based on the evidence at trial."  
State v. Smith, 363 S.C. 111, 115, 609 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ct. App. 2005).  "When 
the record contains no evidence to support it, a voluntary manslaughter jury charge 
should not be given."  Id.
III. Discussion 
Cook asserts the trial court erred in charging the jury with the lesser-
included offense of voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that he 
was acting in the sudden heat of passion.  We agree.
"Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden 
heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation."  State v. Walker, 324 S.C. 257, 
260, 478 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1996). "Both heat of passion and sufficient legal 
provocation must be present at the time of the killing."  Id. At trial, Cook 
conceded that there was sufficient legal provocation.  Therefore, the narrow issue 
on appeal is whether Cook was acting in the sudden heat of passion when he killed 
Victim. 
"Whether or not the facts constitute a sudden heat of passion is an 
appropriate question for the court." State v. Niles, 412 S.C. 515, 522, 772 S.E.2d 
877, 880 (2015). This Court has defined the sudden heat of passion as that which: 
upon sufficient legal provocation, . . . mitigates a felonious killing to 
manslaughter, while it need not dethrone reason entirely, or shut out 
knowledge and volition, must be such as would naturally disturb the 
sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable 
of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human experience, 
may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. 
Id. (citing State v. Walker, 324 S.C. 257, 260, 478 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1996)).   
We do not believe the facts of this case support a finding that Cook shot 
Victim in the sudden heat of passion.  Here, Cook stated he tried to walk away 
from Victim, but Victim kept cutting him off.  The fact that Cook was trying to 
walk away from the conflict does not suggest Cook was incapable of cooling off.  
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In addition, Bridges testified that Cook and Victim were talking softly and that he 
could hardly tell they were arguing.  This too does not suggest that Cook was 
acting under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence as surely if one was so 
enraged to kill, one would not be talking softly with the victim right before the act.  
Further, at no point during Cook's statement does he indicate he lacked control 
over his actions. Accordingly, we believe the facts of this case suggest Cook shot 
Victim either with malice or in self-defense.   
In finding otherwise, the trial court relied on the following facts:  (1) that 
Cook was in fear; (2) Cook shot Victim twice; and (3) Cook's statement "before I 
knew it, I fired a shot." We believe these facts, without more, are insufficient to 
establish Cook was acting in the sudden heat of passion.  
In State v. Starnes, we affirmed the principle that "to warrant a voluntary 
manslaughter charge, the defendant's fear must manifest itself in an uncontrollable 
impulse to do violence."  388 S.C. 590, 598-99, 698 S.E.2d 604, 609 (2010).  We 
do not believe the fact that Cook shot Victim twice or his statement "before I knew 
it, I fired a shot" is evidence that Cook's fear manifested in an uncontrollable 
impulse to do violence.  
In State v. Niles, Niles shot at the victim twice after the victim pulled out his 
gun and shot at Niles, knocking out the rear windows of Niles' vehicle.  412 S.C. at 
520, 772 S.E.2d at 879. Niles stated, "I shot twice.  I went pow, pow." Id.  Niles, 
like Cook, shot at the victim twice; yet, we determined that fact was not enough to
establish Niles was acting under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.  We 
find the same here. Finally, we do not believe Cook's statement "before I knew it, 
I fired a shot" warrants a charge of voluntary manslaughter.  The State argues this 
statement could be interpreted to mean Cook lacked self-control when he shot 
Victim, and thus acted under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.  We 
disagree. Due to the short, swift motion of firing a gun, we believe this statement 
could be heard in any case in which the defendant is charged with firing a weapon, 
even out of self-defense. Thus, we do not believe this statement is indicative as to 
whether Cook was acting under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.  
In addition to the facts articulated and relied upon by the trial court, the State 
relies on our holding in State v. Lowry to support its position that this Court should 
affirm the trial court's decision to charge voluntary manslaughter.  315 S.C. 396, 
434 S.E.2d 272 (1993). We find Lowry distinguishable from this case.     
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In Lowry, the victim approached Lowry outside a grocery store and began 
berating him.  Id. at 398, 434 S.E.2d 273.  The two men began arguing and 
"bumping chests."  Id.  Lowry then aimed a pistol at the victim and pulled the 
trigger, but the pistol was unloaded.  Id.  After Lowry's friend broke up the fight, 
the victim went inside the store.  Id.  Lowry, loaded a clip of ammunition into his 
pistol, fired a single shot into a nearby sign, and followed victim into the store 
where the two began arguing again. Id.  The victim then raised his arms above his 
head, taunting Lowry. Id.  Lowry then shot him in the chest, cursed him, and shot 
him again, but this time in the head.  Id.  This Court determined the trial court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter because there was testimony which, if believed, tended to show the 
victim and Lowry were in a heated argument. Id. at 399, 434 S.E.2d at 274. 
In Lowry, there was both a physical and verbal altercation to support a 
finding of sudden heat of passion.  Here, there was only a verbal altercation, which 
was very brief. Further, in Lowry, it was evident to the witnesses that there was an
altercation between Lowry and the victim due to their conduct.  In contrast, the 
witnesses here could hardly tell Cook and Victim were arguing.  In addition, 
Lowry actively pursued the victim, whereas Cook attempted to walk away from
Victim.  Collectively, Lowry's actions suggest that he was acting in the sudden heat 
of passion.  Cook's actions do not do the same.   
"The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence presented 
at trial." State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993).  "[D]ue 
process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the 
evidence warrants such an instruction." Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 
(1982). "The jury's discretion is thus channeled so that it may convict a defendant 
of any crime fairly supported by the evidence."  Id.  Here, the evidence presented 
at trial indicates Cook either shot Victim with malice or in self-defense.  
Unfortunately, however, as this Court has previously articulated:
due to the error in granting the solicitor's request for a voluntary 
manslaughter charge, [Cook] will not have to face a jury of his peers 
on the charge of murder again.  This is a cautionary tale for solicitors 
as to the pitfalls of requesting a potential "compromise" charge which 
is unsupported by the evidence. 
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State v. Cooley, 342 S.C. 63, 70, 536 S.E.2d 666, 670 (2000).
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Cook's voluntary manslaughter 
conviction.3
REVERSED. 
TOAL, C.J., KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, J., 
not participating. 
3 Due to our reversal of Cook's voluntary manslaughter conviction, we also reverse 
his conviction for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 
crime, as the former conviction is a prerequisite for the latter.  See S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 16-23-490(e) (2003) (providing contemporaneous indictment and conviction of 
violent crime a prerequisite to punishment under section 16-23-490). 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Demetrius Mack, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Leon Lott, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Richland 
County, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002229 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Richland County 

DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27597 

Heard November 17, 2015 – Filed December 9, 2015 

DEPUBLISH THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND DISMISS CERTIORARI AS 

IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 

Robert D. Garfield and Andrew F. Lindemann, both of 
Davidson & Lindemann, P.A., of Columbia, for 
Petitioner. 
Joshua Snow Kendrick and Christopher S. Leonard, both 
of Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of Columbia, and Neal 
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Michael Lourie, of Lourie Law Firm, L.L.C., of 
Columbia, for Respondent.  
PER CURIAM: We granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals'
decision in Mack v. Lott, 410 S.C. 28, 762 S.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 2014).  We now 
dismiss the writ as improvidently granted since both parties and the trial court 
agree that the proper standard for determining probable cause is an objective 
standard; that is, whether the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the 
arrest, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, 
amount to probable cause.  Because the Court of Appeals' language on this issue is 
arguably unclear, for the benefit of the bench and bar, we direct the Court of 
Appeals to depublish its opinion.   
Accordingly, we 
DEPUBLISH THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND 
DISMISS CERTIORARI AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
PLEICONES, Acting Chief Justice, BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., 
and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.  
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
 
In the Matter of David Ross Clarke, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000268 
ORDER 
In 1985, the Court disbarred petitioner from the practice of law in South Carolina.  
In the Matter of Clarke, 290 S.C. 494, 351 S.E.2d 573 (1986).  Petitioner has now 
filed a Petition for Readmission pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  The Court grants the Petition for Readmission.  
The Office of Bar Admissions shall schedule petitioner to be readmitted during the 
next regularly-scheduled swearing-in ceremony. 
Until such time as he has been readmitted to the practice of law, petitioner is under 
a continuing obligation to keep his bar application current and must update 
responses whenever there is an addition to or a change to information previously 
filed with the Clerk of Court. See Rule 402(d)(2), SCACR.  Petitioner shall further 
notify the Clerk of Court if there are any changes to his Petition for Readmission.  
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
December 2, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina

In the Matter of Kristie Ann McAuley, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001408 
ORDER 
By opinion dated June 18, 2014, the Court suspended petition from the practice of 
law for eighteen (18) months, retroactive to August 24, 2011, the date of her 
interim suspension.  In the Matter of McAuley, 408 S.C 402, 759 S.E.2d 743 
(2014). Petitioner filed a Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  After referral to the Committee 
on Character and Fitness (Committee), the Committee has filed a Report and 
Recommendation recommending the Court reinstate petitioner to the practice of
law. 
The Court grants the Petition for Reinstatement provided, however, that petitioner 
shall pay all outstanding license fees and penalties, if any, to the South Carolina
Bar and shall be in full compliance with all continuing legal education
requirements prior to commencing the practice of law.  Petitioner shall complete
the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School no later than twelve (12) 
months from the date of this order as directed by the Court in its June 18, 2014, 
opinion. Petitioner shall file proof of completion of the program with the 
Commission on Lawyer Conduct no later than ten (10) days after the conclusion of 
the programs.         
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
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 s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
December 3, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Robert A. Gamble, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001939 
ORDER 
By opinion dated September 4, 2013, the Court suspended petitioner from the 
practice of law for eighteen (18) months, retroactive to August 24, 2011, the date 
of his interim suspension.  In the Matter of Gamble, 405 S.C. 436, 748 S.E.2d 219 
(2013). Petitioner filed a Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  After referral to the Committee 
on Character and Fitness (Committee), the Committee has filed a Report and 
Recommendation recommending the Court reinstate petitioner to the practice of
law. 
The Court grants the Petition for Reinstatement provided, however, that petitioner 
shall pay all outstanding license fees and penalties, if any, to the South Carolina
Bar and shall be in full compliance with all continuing legal education
requirements prior to commencing the practice of law.  Petitioner shall complete
the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School, Trust Account School, and 
Advertising School no later than twelve (12) months from the date of this order as 
directed by the Court in its September 4, 2013, opinion.  Petitioner shall file proof 
of completion of the programs with the Commission on Lawyer Conduct no later 
than ten (10) days after the conclusion of the programs.         
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
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 s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
December 3, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

David R. Gooldy, Respondent,
v. 
The Storage Center – Platt Springs, LLC, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-000741 
Appeal From Lexington County 

James O. Spence, Master-in-Equity 

Opinion No. 5366 

Heard November 4, 2015 – Filed December 9, 2015 

REVERSED 
Robert E. Stepp and Bess Jones DuRant, both of Sowell 
Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant. 
James Randall Davis, of Davis Frawley Anderson 
McCauley Ayer Fisher & Smith, LLC, of Lexington, for 
Respondent. 
THOMAS, J.:  The Storage Center – Platt Springs, LLC (Storage Center) appeals 
the master-in-equity's order finding David R. Gooldy had easement rights over 
Storage Center's property and awarding Gooldy actual and punitive damages.  On 
appeal, Storage Center argues the master erred in (1) finding the existence of an 
implied easement based on a deed that described the property by referencing a plat 
depicting a "50' Road" notation outside the boundary lines of the property 
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conveyed, (2) finding the existence of an implied easement when the common 
grantor's representative testified there was no intent to create an easement or road, 
and (3) awarding actual and punitive damages.  We reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Gooldy and Storage Center own adjacent properties in Lexington County.  
Gooldy's tract consists of .68 acres (the .68 acre tract) and Storage Center's tract 
consists of 7.35 acres (the 7.35 acre tract).  Storage Center's property surrounds 
Gooldy's property like a horseshoe: it abuts Gooldy's property on the southern, 
western, and northern borders.  Both properties border S.C. Highway 6 on their 
eastern boundaries. Gooldy claims to have an easement over an alleged road on 
Storage Center's property.     
1. Background Information  
In 1974, Congaree Associates1 purchased a 500-acre tract of land containing the 
properties at issue. In 1983, Congaree recorded a subdivision plat for Westchester 
Phase I, containing thirteen lots bordering Highway 6 to the east and what would 
later become the .68 acre tract to the north.  Robert Collingwood was the surveyor 
for the Westchester Phase I plat. Subsequently, Congaree commissioned 
Collingwood to prepare a preliminary plat for a proposed subdivision called 
Westchester Phase II.  This plat depicts a 50-foot road abutting the southern border 
of what would later become the .68 acre tract.  The Westchester Phase II plat was 
never recorded and the subdivision was never developed.   
In 1985, James Loflin, Congaree's agent and employee, hired Collingwood to 
prepare a plat (the Loflin plat) of the .68 acre tract.  The Loflin plat depicts only 
the .68 acre tract; neither Westchester Phase I nor the 7.35 acre tract is depicted.  
The plat includes the notation, "50' road" outside the southern boundary of the .68 
acre tract, on what would later become the 7.35 acre tract.  The 50-foot road 
notation is not listed as an easement and the length of the road is not discernible 
from the face of the plat.  In 1986, Congaree, by its general partner Carroll McGee, 
conveyed the .68 acre tract to Loflin by a deed that referenced the Loflin plat.  
Every deed in the chain of title for the .68 acre tract incorporates the Loflin plat.  
1 Congaree is the common grantor of the .68 acre and 7.35 acre tracts. 
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Gooldy purchased the .68 acre tract on January 24, 2002, and used the area 
depicted as a 50-foot road on the Loflin plat to access his property.  In describing 
the .68 acre tract, Gooldy's deed reads as follows: 
All those certain piece, parcel or lot of land, with all 
improvements thereon, situate, lying and being on the 
western side of S.C. Highway No. 6, approximately 580 
feet south of the intersection of Platt Springs Road and 
S.C. Highway No. 6, near the town of Lexington, in the 
County of Lexington, State of South Carolina, and being 
shown and designated on [the Loflin plat].  The within 
described property contains .68 acre more or less. 
Storage Center purchased the 7.35 acre tract on September 27, 2007.  The deed to 
Storage Center's property does not reference the Loflin plat; instead, it references a 
plat (the Strasburger plat) that does not depict a 50-foot road on Storage Center's 
property.  The Strasburger plat classifies the alleged road as a "parking and gravel 
drive encroachment."  After purchasing the 7.35 acre tract, a Storage Center 
representative and Gooldy unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a "shared access 
agreement" for the strip of land Gooldy used as a driveway.  As a result, in 2009, 
Storage Center barricaded the driveway.  
2. Procedural History 
On February 1, 2010, Gooldy filed a complaint against Storage Center, seeking a 
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages.  With the parties' consent, the 
circuit court referred the case to the master.  Thereafter, both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment.  In support of its motion, Storage Center filed an affidavit 
from Loflin, who attested the 50-foot road shown on the Loflin plat did not exist, 
was not part of the property he owned, and was not intended to create an easement.  
Loflin stated he never received an easement over the 7.35 acre tract.   
The master denied the cross motions for summary judgment and the case 
proceeded to trial. At trial, Gooldy testified that after speaking with the seller's 
realtor and reviewing the Loflin plat, he believed he had an easement over the 7.35 
acre tract for a driveway, and he relied on that belief in purchasing the property.  
Gooldy explained that as a result of Storage Center's barricade, he had to close his 
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business for one week to build a new driveway.  He claimed it cost $10,000 to 
construct the new driveway and attributed half that cost to lost income.  
McGee testified Congaree never installed the road in question.  He acknowledged 
Congaree commissioned a plat for Westchester Phase II; however, he noted the 
plat was never recorded because the project was too costly.  McGee testified 
Congaree did not intend to create any easement rights in conveying the .68 acre 
tract to Loflin. More specifically, McGee stated Congaree did not intend to convey 
any property outside the boundaries of the .68 acre tract depicted in the Loflin plat.  
McGee admitted he reviewed the Loflin plat before conveying the property to 
Loflin but stated he never gave Loflin permission to use the alleged 50-foot road.  
Additionally, McGee noted the Strasburger plat did not depict a road on the 7.35 
acre tract because the road did not exist.   
Charles Meeler, the surveyor who prepared the Strasburger plat, testified there was 
no road abutting the .68 acre parcel.  Meeler explained he included the "parking 
and gravel drive encroachment" notation on the plat because he believed Gooldy 
was using Congaree's property as a driveway.  Meeler did not include a 50-foot 
road on the Strasburger plat because after reviewing the Loflin plat and other 
county and state records, in his professional opinion, no road existed.   
Rosser Baxter, an expert surveyor, opined the 50-foot road notation on the Loflin 
plat is not a plat of a road, does not create a road, and does not mean a road 
actually exists.  Baxter testified the Loflin plat is a survey only of the .68 acre tract
and nothing outside the boundaries of the tract was included in the survey.  He 
stated the Loflin plat was "an individual lot plat," not a "subdivision plat."  Baxter 
concluded, after reviewing the Loflin plat and public records, the 50-foot road 
designation was erroneously included on the Loflin plat.  
The master concluded Gooldy was entitled to an easement because his deed 
referenced a plat showing the .68 acre tract bordered by a 50-foot road.  The master 
also concluded evidence surrounding the initial conveyance of the .68 acre tract 
demonstrated Congaree and Loflin intended to create an easement over the road.  
Additionally, the master awarded Gooldy $2,500 for lost income and $7,500 in 
punitive damages.  This appeal followed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law 
action, and this [c]ourt reviews factual issues relating to the existence of an 
easement under a highly deferential standard."  Inlet Harbour v. S.C. Dep't of 
Parks, Recreation & Tourism, 377 S.C. 86, 91, 659 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2008) 
(citation omitted).  "In an action at law tried without a jury, the judge's findings of 
fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no evidentiary support for the 
judge's findings."  Murrells Inlet Corp. v. Ward, 378 S.C. 225, 231, 662 S.E.2d 
452, 455 (Ct. App. 2008).
LAW/ANALYSIS
Storage Center argues the master erred in finding (1) the existence of an easement 
based on the deed's reference to the Loflin plat and (2) that Congaree and Loflin 
intended to create an easement in favor of the .68 acre tract.  We agree.
"An easement is a right given to a person to use the land of another for a specific 
purpose." Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 304, 772 S.E.2d 163, 169 (2015). 
"Easements can arise by both express creation and by implication."  Inlet Harbour, 
377 S.C. at 91, 659 S.E.2d at 154. "A reservation of an easement in a deed by 
which lands are conveyed is equivalent, for the purpose of the creation of the 
easement, to an express grant of the easement by the grantee of the lands."  Ward v. 
Evans, 387 S.C. 401, 409, 693 S.E.2d 7, 11 (Ct. App. 2010).  "[W]here a deed 
describes land as is shown as a certain plat, such becomes a part of the deed."  
Murrells Inlet, 378 S.C. at 232, 662 S.E.2d at 455 (alteration in original).   
"Although the incorporation by reference in a deed to a plat or map may create an 
easement by express grant, an easement by reference to a map or pla[t] is not an 
express easement but rather an easement by implication."  28A C.J.S. Easements
§ 96 (2008) (footnote omitted).  "The creation of an implied easement generally 
requires that the facts and circumstances surrounding the conveyance, the property, 
the parties, or some other characteristic demonstrate that the objective intention of 
the parties was to create an easement."  Inlet Harbour, 377 S.C. at 92, 659 S.E.2d 
at 154. "The purpose of an implied easement is to give effect to the intentions of 
the parties to a transaction, and because the implication of an easement in a 
conveyance goes against the general rule that a written instrument speaks for itself, 
implied easements are not favored."  Id. at 91-92, 659 S.E.2d at 154. 
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"[T]he intentions of the parties to the transaction are the overriding focus when 
examining implied easements."  Id. at 92, 659 S.E.2d at 154. However, our courts 
have "developed various presumptions regarding the creation of implied easements 
in certain circumstances."  Id.  "One such presumption arises when an owner 
subdivides his land and has the land platted into lots and streets."  Id.  We have 
"recognized the general rule that when an owner conveys subdivided lots and 
references the plat in the deed, the owner grants the lot owners an easement over 
the streets appearing in the plat." Id.  Thus, "[o]nce an easement is referenced in a 
plat, the easement is dedicated to the use of the owners of the lots, their successors 
in title, and to the public in general." Ward, 387 S.C. at 409, 693 S.E.2d at 11.
"As to the grantor, who conveyed the property with reference to the plat, and the 
grantee and his successors, the dedication of the easement is complete at the time
the conveyance is made." Murrells Inlet, 378 S.C. at 233, 662 S.E.2d at 456. 
Although a grantee is entitled to a presumption that a grantor intended to create an 
easement over a road appearing in a plat referenced in a deed, the presumption is 
not a rigid one. See Inlet Harbour, 377 S.C. at 93, 659 S.E.2d at 155 (discussing 
"problems that might occur if [appellate courts] were to apply a rigid presumption 
based solely upon particular geography or land division").  The presumption may 
be rebutted by evidence demonstrating the parties did not intend to create an 
easement. See id. ("[T]o the extent the [appellant] urges this [c]ourt to ignore 
everything except the deed's reference to a residential subdivision plat, this 
argument fails to remain true to the principles underlying implied easements."); 
Murrells Inlet, 378 S.C. at 234, 662 S.E.2d at 456 ("Absent evidence of the seller's 
intent to the contrary, a conveyance of land that references a map depicting streets 
conveys to the purchaser, as a matter of law, a private easement by implication 
with respect to those streets, whether or not there is a dedication to public use." 
(emphasis added)).   
Furthermore, a plat "is not an index to encumbrances."  Bennett v. Investors Title 
Ins. Co., 370 S.C. 561, 575, 635 S.E.2d 660, 668 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Lancaster v. Smithco, Inc., 246 S.C. 464, 469, 144 S.E.2d 209, 
211 (1965)). A deed that references a plat merely "for descriptive purposes does 
not incorporate a notation thereon as to an easement held by a third party so as to 
exclude such easement from the covenant against encumbrances in the absence of 
a clear intention that it so operate." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lancaster, 246 
S.C. at 469, 144 S.E.2d at 211). Thus, in determining the existence of an 
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easement, "[o]ur guidepost must be what the parties intended, and the best 
evidence of the parties' intentions are the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
conveyance."  Inlet Harbour, 377 S.C. at 93, 659 S.E.2d at 155. 
1. Presumption of an Easement 
We find the master erred in determining Gooldy was entitled to the presumption of 
an easement based on the deed's reference to the Loflin plat.  We are mindful of the 
general rule "that when an owner conveys subdivided lots and references the plat in 
the deed, the owner grants the lot owners an easement over the streets appearing in 
the plat." Id. at 92, 659 S.E.2d at 154. Nonetheless, our courts disfavor implied 
easements "because the implication of an easement in a conveyance goes against 
the general rule that a written instrument speaks for itself."  Id. at 91-92, 659 
S.E.2d at 154.
Both Lancaster and Bennett make clear that a plat "is not an index to 
encumbrances," and a deed that references a plat "for descriptive purposes does not 
incorporate a notation thereon as to an easement held by a third party so as to 
exclude such easement from the covenant against encumbrances in the absence of 
a clear intention that it so operate." Lancaster, 246 S.C. at 469, 144 S.E.2d at 211; 
Bennett, 370 S.C. at 575, 635 S.E.2d at 668. In the instant case, Gooldy's deed 
references the Loflin plat in a paragraph describing the .68 acre tract.  The 
paragraph does not provide the metes and bounds of the property.  However, the 
sentence following the reference to the Loflin plat states, "The within described
property contains .68 acre more or less."  (emphasis added).  We find this sentence 
refers to the property described in the Loflin plat. In our view, the deed references 
the Loflin plat for descriptive purposes—to show the metes and bounds of the .68 
acre tract—not for the purpose of granting an easement in favor of the .68 acre 
tract over an alleged road depicted outside the boundaries of the property.  
Accordingly, we hold the record does not support the master's finding that Gooldy 
was entitled to the presumption of an easement because his deed referenced the 
Loflin plat. See Inlet Harbour, 377 S.C. at 91, 659 S.E.2d at 153 ("The 
determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law action, 
and this [c]ourt reviews factual issues relating to the existence of an easement 
under a highly deferential standard." (citation omitted)).    
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2. Intent Analysis 
We find the master also erred in determining the evidence surrounding the initial 
conveyance of the .68 acre tract demonstrated the parties' intent to create an 
easement. "The creation of an implied easement generally requires that the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the conveyance, the property, the parties, or some 
other characteristic demonstrate that the objective intention of the parties was to 
create an easement."  Id. at 92, 659 S.E.2d at 154. In evaluating the parties' intent, 
we note "the best evidence of the parties' intentions are the facts and circumstances
surrounding the conveyance."  Id. at 93, 659 S.E.2d at 155.
First, uncontroverted evidence demonstrates the parties to the initial conveyance 
did not intend to create an easement.  McGee testified Congaree did not intend to 
create any easement rights when it conveyed the .68 acre tract to Loflin.  He stated 
Congaree did not intend to convey any property outside the boundary lines of the 
.68 acre tract depicted on the Loflin plat.  He also claimed Congaree never gave 
Loflin permission to use the strip of land depicted as a 50-foot road.  Similarly, 
Loflin attested the 50-foot road shown on the Loflin plat did not exist, was not part 
of the property he owned, and was not intended to create an easement.  Loflin 
stated he never received an express or implied easement over the 7.35 acre tract.  
Accordingly, the testimony of the parties to the initial conveyance demonstrates 
neither party intended to create an easement.
Second, the deed itself does not manifest the parties' intent to create an easement.  
We recognize "[r]ecordation of a plat containing an easement may be sufficient to 
show that the owner intended to dedicate that easement."  Murrells Inlet, 378 S.C. 
at 234, 662 S.E.2d at 456 (emphasis added). However, recordation of the Loflin 
plat is not dispositive of the parties' intent in this case.  See Inlet Harbour, 377 S.C. 
at 93, 659 S.E.2d at 155 ("[T]o the extent the [appellant] urges this [c]ourt to 
ignore everything except the deed's reference to a residential subdivision plat, this 
argument fails to remain true to the principles underlying implied easements.").  As 
previously discussed, Gooldy's deed incorporates the Loflin plat only to describe 
the metes and bounds of the property, not to create an easement in an alleged road 
depicted outside those boundaries.  
Third, although the master noted the unrecorded Westchester Phase II plat depicted 
a road in the same location as the Loflin plat, Congaree never developed 
Westchester Phase II, and McGee testified Congaree never installed the road 
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depicted in the Westchester Phase II plat.  Indeed, no recorded plat—other than the 
Loflin plat—depicts the road Gooldy was using as a driveway.  Moreover, Meeler 
and Baxter—both surveyors who reviewed the properties, Loflin plat, and other 
public records—testified no road existed in the area Gooldy claimed an easement.  
Based on our analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the conveyance, 
the property, the parties, and other characteristics, we find there is no evidence to 
support the master's conclusion that Congaree and Loflin intended to create an 
easement. Accordingly, we reverse the master's order finding Gooldy had 
easement rights over Storage Center's property. 
3. Damages
Based on our conclusion that the master erred in determining Gooldy had easement 
rights over Storage Center's property, we find the master also erred in awarding 
damages arising from Storage Center's conduct.  As a result, the master's damages 
awards are reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold the master erred in finding Gooldy had easement rights over a road on 
Storage Center's property and awarding Gooldy damages.  The master's order is 
therefore 
REVERSED. 
HUFF, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
Elouise Woody Benjamin, Melvin Benjamin, Joshua Lee 
Cail, Naida L. Singleton, and Pee Dee Heating and 
Cooling Specialists, Defendants, 
 
Of whom Elouise Woody Benjamin and Melvin 
Benjamin are the Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001321 
Appeal From Chesterfield County 

Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5367 

Heard November 4, 2014 – Filed December 9, 2015 

AFFIRMED  

Dominic Allen Starr and Alan Grant Jones, both of 
McAngus, Goudelock, & Courie, of Myrtle Beach, for 
Appellant. 
Robert Norris Hill, of the Law Office of Robert Hill, of 
Lexington, and William P. Hatfield, of Hatfield Temple, 
LLP, of Florence, for Respondents. 
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MCDONALD, J.:  In this declaratory judgment action, Auto-Owners Insurance 
Company (Auto-Owners) appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Respondents Elouise and Melvin Benjamin (collectively, the Benjamins).  
Auto-Owners argues the circuit court erred in determining that a commercial 
general liability policy (CGL Policy) issued to Pee Dee Heating and Cooling 
Specialists, Inc. (Pee Dee) provided additional coverage for injuries sustained by 
Elouise Benjamin in an automobile accident involving a Pee Dee employee.  We 
affirm.     
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Naida Singleton and Brett Singleton own and operate Pee Dee, which is located in 
Chesterfield County.  On February 14, 2008, Auto-Owners issued Pee Dee an 
automobile insurance policy (Auto Policy).  The Auto Policy provided $300,000 in 
coverage for combined liability, uninsured, and underinsured protection on five 
scheduled drivers and six scheduled vehicles, as well as comprehensive coverage, 
collision, and "road trouble service."   
On February 15, 2008, Auto-Owners issued Pee Dee a CGL Policy providing 
$2,000,000 in commercial general liability coverage and an endorsement providing 
$1,000,000 in liability coverage for "hired auto" and "non-owned auto."  The 
policy provisions forming the basis of the inquiry in this case are contained in three 
portions of the CGL Policy: (1) the commercial general liability Aircraft, Auto or 
Watercraft Exclusion (the Exclusion); (2) the commercial general liability Other 
Insurance Condition (the Condition); and (3) the commercial general liability 
Endorsement (the Endorsement).   
Pursuant to the Exclusion, found in Section I - COVERAGES, Coverage A. 
BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY, Exclusion g.
Aircraft, Auto or Watercraft, no coverage exists for the following:  
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of 
any aircraft, "auto" or watercraft owned or operated by or 
rented or loaned to any insured.  Use includes operation 
and "loading and unloading". 
This exclusion applies even if the claims against any 
insured allege negligence or other wrongdoing in the 
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 supervision, hiring, employment, training or monitoring 
of others by that insured, if the "occurrence" which 
caused the "bodily injury" or "property damage" involved 
the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others 
of any aircraft, "auto" or watercraft owned or operated by 
or rented or loaned to any insured. 
The Condition, found in Section IV - COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
CONDITIONS, provides in pertinent part:   
 4. Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the 
insured for a loss we cover under Coverage A or B of this 
Coverage Part, our obligations are limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
 
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies.  
If this insurance is primary, our obligations are not 
affected unless any of the other insurance is also primary. 
Then, we will share with all that other insurance by the 
method described in c. below. 
 
b. Excess Insurance 
 
This insurance is excess over: 
 
(1) Any of the other insurance, whether primary, excess, 
or contingent or on any other basis: 
 
. . . . 
 
(d) If the loss arises out of the maintenance or use of 
aircraft, "autos" or watercraft to the extent not subject to 
Exclusion g. of Section I - Coverage A - Bodily Injury 
and Property Damage Liability. 
  . . . . 
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 We will share the remaining loss, if any, with any other 
insurance that is not described in the Excess Insurance  
provision and was not bought specifically to apply in 
excess of the Limits of Insurance shown in the 
Declarations of this Coverage Part.   
Finally, the Endorsement modifies the insurance provided by the CGL 
"COVERAGE PART."  Pursuant to the second section of the Endorsement, titled 
"HIRED AUTO AND NON-OWNED AUTO LIABILITY," the CGL Policy 
states the following: 
Coverage for "bodily injury" and "property damage" 
liability under SECTION I - COVERAGES, 
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND 
PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY, is extended as 
follows under this item, but only if you do not have any 
other insurance available to you which affords the same 
or similar coverage.   
Coverage 
We will pay those sums the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" arising out of the maintenance or use 
of an "auto": 
a.	 You do not own; 
 
b. Which is not registered in your name; or 
 
c.	 Which is not leased or rented to you for more than 
ninety consecutive days and which is used in your 
business. 
Exclusions 
With respect only to HIRED AUTO AND NON-
OWNED AUTO LIABILITY, the exclusions which 
apply to SECTION I - COVERAGES, COVERAGE 
A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE 
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LIABILITY, other than the Nuclear Energy Liability 
Exclusion Endorsement, do not apply . . . 
Although the CGL Policy generally excluded automobile accidents under the 
Exclusion, Pee Dee purchased the Endorsement, which, in limited circumstances, 
provided liability coverage under the CGL Policy for "bodily injury" and "property 
damage" arising out of an automobile accident.  However, the CGL Policy 
contained a clause stating the Endorsement only applied "if you do not have any 
other insurance available to you which affords the same or similar coverage."  
April 1, 2008 was the effective date for both the CGL Policy and its Endorsement 
as well as the Auto Policy. 
On April 7, 2008, a Pee Dee employee, Joshua Lee Cail, was involved in an 
automobile accident with Elouise Benjamin.  At the time of the accident, Cail was 
driving a 2004 Toyota Tacoma pickup truck owned by Naida Singleton, used by 
Pee Dee for business purposes, and insured by the Auto-Owners Auto Policy.  
Elouise Benjamin's medical expenses exceed $500,000. 
On May 15, 2008, the Benjamins filed suit against Naida Singleton, Cail, and Pee 
Dee for injuries and damages resulting from the automobile accident.  Auto-
Owners filed a declaratory judgment action on December 19, 2008, seeking a 
declaration that the Auto Policy did not provide coverage for Cail because, at the 
time of the accident, he was not a permissive driver as required by the Auto Policy.  
The circuit court disagreed, determining that Cail was a permissive driver under 
the Auto Policy at the time of the accident.1
On June 14, 2011, Auto-Owners and the Benjamins entered into a settlement 
agreement providing that Auto-Owners would pay the Benjamins the Auto Policy 
limits of $300,000.  In turn, the Benjamins released Cail and Auto-Owners under 
the Auto Policy and signed a covenant not to execute against Singleton and Pee 
Dee. The settlement agreement further provided that Auto-Owners reserved the 
right to seek a declaratory judgment to determine whether the CGL Policy 
provided coverage for the automobile accident. The Benjamins agreed that if the 
circuit court determined the CGL Policy provided coverage for their claims, the 
total recovery available would be the aggregate amount of $300,000 from the Auto 
Policy and the applicable limits of the CGL Policy. 
1 This order was not appealed. 
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Auto-Owners filed the current declaratory judgment action on July 8, 2011.  Both 
Auto-Owners and the Benjamins filed cross motions for summary judgment as to 
whether the CGL Policy provided coverage for the Benjamins' claims.  Following a 
January 28, 2013 hearing, the circuit court granted the Benjamins' motion for 
summary judgment and denied Auto-Owners' cross-motion by order filed March 
22, 2013. On June 3, 2013, the circuit court denied Auto-Owners' motion to alter 
or amend.
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the circuit court err in finding Pee Dee's CGL Policy provided coverage in 
addition to that provided by the Auto Policy?  
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment under the same
standard applied by the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP."  Bovain v. Canal 
Ins., 383 S.C. 100, 105, 678 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2009).  The circuit court may grant a 
motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c), SCRCP. "In determining 
whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can 
reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party."  Quail Hill, LLC v. Cty. of Richland, 387 S.C. 223, 235, 692 
S.E.2d 499, 505 (2010) (quoting Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 563, 633 
S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006)). "Summary judgment should not be granted even when 
there is no dispute as to evidentiary facts if there is dispute as to the conclusion to 
be drawn from those facts."  Id. (quoting Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 
S.C. 372, 378, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000)).  
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Auto-Owners contends the circuit court erred in granting the Benjamins' motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that the CGL Policy's Endorsement provides no 
coverage for the automobile accident due to the "same or similar coverage" 
provided by the Auto Policy.  We disagree. 
"Insurance policies are subject to the general rules of contract construction." 
Whitlock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 399 S.C. 610, 614, 732 S.E.2d 626, 628 
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(2012) (quoting M & M Corp. of S.C. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 390 S.C. 255, 259, 
701 S.E.2d 33, 35 (2010)). "The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to 
ascertain and give legal effect to the parties' intentions as determined by the 
contract language." Id. (quoting McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 
571, 574 (2009)). "Courts must enforce, not write, contracts of insurance, and their 
language must be given its plain, ordinary and popular meaning."  Id. (quoting 
USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 655, 661 S.E.2d 791, 797 
(2008)). 
"Where the contract's language is clear and unambiguous, the language alone 
determines the contract's force and effect."  Whitlock, 399 S.C. at 615, 732 S.E.2d 
at 628 (quoting McGill, 381 S.C. at 185, 672 S.E.2d at 574).  Whether the language 
of a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.  Id. "An insurance 
contract is read as a whole document so that 'one may not, by pointing out a single 
sentence or clause, create an ambiguity.'"  Beaufort Cty. Sch. Dist. v. United Nat'l 
Ins. Co., 392 S.C. 506, 516, 709 S.E.2d 85, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
Yarborough v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266 S.C. 584, 592, 225 S.E.2d 344, 348 
(1976)). However, this court must construe "[a]mbiguous or conflicting terms in 
an insurance policy . . . liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the 
insurer." Whitlock, 399 S.C. at 615, 732 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Clegg, 377 S.C. at 
655, 661 S.E.2d at 797).  "Insurance policy exclusions are construed most strongly 
against the insurance company, which also bears the burden of establishing the 
exclusion's applicability."  Owners Ins. Co. v. Clayton, 364 S.C. 555, 560, 614 
S.E.2d 611, 614 (2005). 
In Beaufort County School District, this court explained the differences between a 
patent ambiguity and a latent ambiguity:
A patent ambiguity is one that arises upon the words of a 
will, deed, or contract. A latent ambiguity exists when 
there is no defect arising on the face of the instrument, 
but arising when attempting to apply the words of the 
instrument to the object or subject described. 
Interpretation of an unambiguous policy, or a policy with 
a patent ambiguity, is for the court.  Interpretation of a 
policy with a latent ambiguity is for the jury.  
392 S.C. at 526, 709 S.E.2d at 95–96 (citations omitted). 
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Here, the Benjamins' "bodily injury" and "property damage" arose out of the 
maintenance or use of an "auto" owned by Naida Singleton, driven by Cail, and 
insured under Auto-Owners' Auto Policy.  Pee Dee is the named insured on the 
Auto Policy as well as the CGL Policy and its Endorsement.  Although Cail was 
not listed as a scheduled driver on the Auto Policy, the circuit court found that he 
was a permissive user and was therefore covered under the Auto Policy.
Our review of the record reveals Pee Dee satisfied the requirements for CGL 
coverage as listed in the Endorsement.  Specifically, Pee Dee did not own the 2004 
Toyota Tacoma pickup truck involved in the accident; the truck was not registered 
in Pee Dee's name; the truck was not leased or rented to Pee Dee for more than 
ninety consecutive days; the truck was used in Pee Dee's business; and the truck 
was one of the six automobiles described in the Declarations Section of the Auto 
Policy. Despite the fact that the truck was covered by Auto-Owners' Auto Policy, 
we agree with the circuit court that the Endorsement also provided coverage.   
According to Auto-Owners, "[t]he Endorsement is neither supplemental nor excess 
coverage to the Auto Policy. . . . [I]t provides coverage to Pee Dee for a different 
set of facts." We disagree. The exclusions applicable to SECTION I -
COVERAGES, COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY 
DAMAGE LIABILITY of the CGL Policy—with the exception of one, which is 
not applicable here—do not apply to Pee Dee's CGL Policy because Pee Dee 
purchased the Endorsement. Consideration of the Condition, found in SECTION 
IV - COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY CONDITIONS, demonstrates 
that the CGL Policy and its Endorsement are in fact supplemental or excess 
coverage to the Auto Policy because "the loss [arose] out of the maintenance or use 
of" the 2004 Toyota Tacoma, which is "not subject to Exclusion g. of Section I -
Coverage A - Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability."  Thus, we find the 
circuit court properly concluded that Auto-Owners' "CGL Policy provides 
coverage for the accident at issue through its Endorsement" and did not err in 
granting the Benjamins' motion for summary judgment on the additional coverage 
argument. 
A. The Term "Same" 
Auto-Owners argues "the inclusion of the term 'same' precludes the court from 
interpreting [similar] to mean 'the same' or 'identical.'"  However, Auto-Owners did 
not address the term "same" in its motion for summary judgment, its reply to 
Respondents' response in opposition, or its motion to alter or amend.  Additionally, 
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the circuit court did not address the interpretation of the term "same" in its order 
granting the Benjamins' motion for summary judgment or its order denying Auto-
Owners' motion alter or amend.  See Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 
412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) ("It is well-settled that an issue cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial 
court to be preserved for appellate review.").  Moreover, Auto-Owners' argument 
regarding the term "same" is limited to one sentence and fails to cite to any 
authority.  See Rule 208(b)(1)(D), SCACR (requiring discussion of the appellant's
legal arguments and citations to authorities); First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 
361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (noting that when a party fails to cite 
authority or when the argument is simply a conclusory statement, the party is 
deemed to have abandoned the issue on appeal).  Therefore, we find this argument 
is not preserved for appellate review.   
B. "Similar Coverage" Provision 
Auto-Owners argues the circuit court erred in finding the "similar coverage" 
provision of the Endorsement was ambiguous and in relying on South Carolina 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Courtney, 342 S.C. 271, 536 S.E.2d 
689 (Ct. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 349 S.C. 366, 563 S.E.2d 648 (2002) 
(holding an automatic termination clause allowing unilateral cancellation by 
insurer when the insured obtains similar coverage on a covered automobile is 
invalid). We disagree. 
In Courtney, a husband and wife owned a Saturn and a Chevrolet Camaro, which 
were insured by Farm Bureau under separate policies.  342 S.C. at 273, 536 S.E.2d 
at 690. Both policies included underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) in limits of 
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence, with property damage limits of 
$25,000 per accident (100/300/25).  Id. In September 1997, wife was involved in 
an accident, and the Camaro was subsequently declared a total loss.  Id. Farm
Bureau tendered payment under the vehicle's collision coverage.  Id. Although the 
policy on the Camaro was set to expire on October 4, 1997, Farm Bureau neither 
issued husband a notice of cancellation nor refunded any unearned premiums.  Id. 
Using the proceeds from the policy on the Camaro, wife purchased a pick-up truck, 
which she insured with Unisun on October 8, 1997, without husband's knowledge 
or consent. Id. The Unisun policy provided personal liability limits of $15,000 per 
person and $30,000 per occurrence, with property damage limits of $25,000. Id. 
Although the Unisun policy provided identical uninsured motorist coverage, it did 
not provide any UIM coverage.  Id. at 274, 536 S.E.2d at 690. 
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On October 27, 1997, husband was seriously injured in an accident while driving 
the Saturn. Id. Husband's medical bills and other losses exceeded the amount 
received from the at-fault driver's insurer.  Id.  Farm Bureau paid husband the UIM
limits from the Saturn's policy "but denied his attempt to stack UIM coverage from 
the Camaro's policy, claiming the Unisun policy obtained by [wife] automatically 
terminated Farm Bureau's policy on the Camaro."  Id. Farm Bureau brought a 
declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination as to its obligation under the 
Camaro's policy.  Id.  The circuit court found that the Unisun policy on the pick-up 
truck was not "similar" insurance sufficient to invoke the automatic termination 
clause in the Farm Bureau policy on the Camaro.  Id. at 275, 536 S.E.2d at 691. 
This court affirmed, concluding that because the Unisun policy differed "in both 
the amount of coverage and the kind of coverage provided, the policies will not be 
held to be 'similar' insurance."  Id. at 279, 536 S.E.2d at 693.  Our supreme court 
agreed with this construction of the automatic termination clause, but went a step 
further, concluding "such a clause is not valid in any event."  Courtney, 349 S.C. at 
372, 563 S.E.2d at 651. 
Here, the circuit court found the "similar coverage" provision of the Endorsement 
to be ambiguous, and thus was required to construe the provision liberally in favor 
of the Benjamins and strictly against Auto-Owners.  See, e.g., Whitlock, 399 S.C. at 
615, 732 S.E.2d at 628 (explaining that appellate courts must construe 
"[a]mbiguous or conflicting terms in an insurance policy . . . liberally in favor of 
the insured and strictly against the insurer" (quoting Clegg, 377 S.C. at 655, 661 
S.E.2d at 797)); Clayton, 364 S.C. at 560, 614 S.E.2d at 614 (clarifying that 
insurance policy exclusions are construed "most strongly against the insurance 
company, which also bears the burden of establishing the exclusion's 
applicability"). The circuit court was not persuaded by Auto-Owners' argument 
that "the Courtney decisions are inapplicable here" and instead "[found] them
instructive."2
2 The circuit court explained: "The court of appeals' discussion [in Courtney] as to 
the ambiguity of the term 'similar' focused on the ambiguous nature of the term
itself rather than its unique context within automatic termination clauses, stating, 'It 
is difficult to imagine being called upon to interpret a more imprecise term.' Id. at 
275, 536 S.E.2d at 691." 
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Several jurisdictions have concluded that the term "similar" is inherently vague in a 
number of contexts.  See, e.g., McCuen v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 946 F.2d 
1401, 1408 (8th Cir. 1991) (explaining the term "similar" is "so elastic, so lacking 
in concrete content," that it imports "substantial ambiguities" into an officer and 
director's liability policy); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ragsdale, 213 S.W.3d 51, 
56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding the clause "other similar insurance" is 
ambiguous because it could mean the underinsured coverage is excess over any 
other applicable coverage or it could mean the underinsured coverage is excess 
over any other underinsured motorist coverage); Knowlton v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 670 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (finding that "'similar coverage'
given its ordinary and usual meaning, is reasonably susceptible of more than one 
interpretation and is therefore ambiguous.  By its very definition 'similar' is a broad 
term and would permit [insurer] to deny uninsured coverage to any 'other person'
who has applicable coverage under some sort of insurance policy, not just 
uninsured motorist coverage."); Caldwell v. Transp. Ins. Co., 364 S.E.2d 1, 2–3 
(Va. 1988) (holding a policy exclusion of loss of property "while below ground 
surface in mining, tunneling, or similar operation" was insufficiently precise to 
exclude coverage of loss of equipment during drilling of well) (emphasis added)).   
Conversely, other jurisdictions have concluded that the term "similar" is not 
ambiguous.  See, e.g., Cal. Dairies Inc. v. RSUI Indem. Co., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 
1037–38 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that if the court were to define the term "similar" 
as the "same" or "identical," that definition would defeat the exclusionary 
provision's purpose of avoiding the moral hazard of employers insuring against 
labor law violations); Gangi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 360 A.2d 907, 908 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1976) (explaining that the word "similar" as ordinarily used means 
"general likeness although allowing for some degree of difference"); Newman v. 
Raleigh Internal Med. Assocs., P.A., 362 S.E.2d 623, 626 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) 
(finding that "similar" is a commonly used word, with an easily ascertainable 
definition in an employment contract dispute).   
In this case, the Endorsement clause provides coverage under the CGL Policy for 
"bodily injury" and "property damage" arising out of an automobile accident in 
limited circumstances, "but only if you do not have any other insurance available 
to you which affords the same or similar coverage."  Because the term "similar" is 
not defined in the CGL Policy or its Endorsement, it must be defined according to 
the usual understanding of the ordinary person.  See Beaufort Cty. Sch. Dist., 392 
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S.C. at 518, 709 S.E.2d at 91 (stating policy language must be given its "plain, 
ordinary, and popular meaning").   
The term "similar" means "having likeness or resemblance especially in a general 
way." Random House College Dictionary 1226 (rev. ed. 1980). The term 
"similar" is also defined as:    
Nearly corresponding; resembling in many respects; 
somewhat alike; having a general likeness, although 
allowing for some degree of difference. . . . [S]imilar is 
generally interpreted to mean that one thing has a 
resemblance in many respects, nearly corresponds, is
somewhat like, or has a general likeness to some other 
thing but is not identical in form and substance, although 
in some cases "similar" may mean identical or exactly
alike. It is a word with different meanings depending on 
[the] context in which it is used. 
Similar, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
That the term "similar" is not defined in the Endorsement creates ambiguity as to 
its precise meaning.3  We find Courtney, as well as case law from other 
jurisdictions, supports our conclusion that "similar" is ambiguous as used in the 
policy because it is neither defined by the policy nor is the definition easily 
ascertainable. As the drafter of the CGL Policy and Endorsement, Auto-Owners 
could have easily defined the phrase "similar coverage" to include the Auto Policy.
Likewise, Auto-Owners could have excluded coverage in the event of "any other 
insurance policy." Moreover, Auto-Owners could have drafted the Endorsement 
so that the "similar coverage" exclusion applied to a different insurance policy with 
different coverage sold by Auto-Owners to the same policy holder.  Because the 
burden rests with the insurer to clearly enumerate the terms in its policy—and 
ambiguous terms are to be construed strictly against the insurer—we find the 
circuit court properly construed the Endorsement in favor of coverage.  See 
Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Homestead Indus., Inc., 318 S.C. 231, 236, 456 S.E.2d 
3 See Courtney, 342 S.C. at 275 n.2, 536 S.E.2d at 691 n.2 (stating "words are 
ambiguous when 'their signification seems doubtful and uncertain to persons of 
competent skill and knowledge to understand them'" (quoting Similar, BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
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 912, 915 (1995) (holding that ambiguities are strictly construed against the 
insurer). 
C. Interpretation of "Similar" within the Context of the Policy 
Auto-Owners further contends that the circuit court erroneously interpreted the 
term "similar" without properly considering the context in which it was used in the 
policy. We disagree. 
In its order, the circuit court concluded that the Courtney court's focus was "term-
centric" and that the word "similar" was as ambiguous in the Endorsement as it 
was in the Courtney policy. Like the circuit court, we recognize "the 'vast 
difference' in coverage between the two policies," and we agree that the coverage 
provided by the two policies is not "similar."     
Auto-Owners contends the Auto Policy and Endorsement have "characteristics in 
common" and are "alike although not identical."  Both policies provide coverage 
for "bodily injury" and "property damage" liability from the maintenance or use of 
an automobile, coverage to Pee Dee and any permissive user, and protection from 
personal liability arising out of an auto accident.  However, our review of the 
policies as a whole reveals a number of differences between the Auto Policy and 
the CGL Policy's Endorsement: 
 Auto Policy CGL Policy Endorsement 
Issued February 14, 2008 February 15, 2008 
Effective April 1, 2008 April 1, 2008 
Limits $300,000 $1,000,000 
Coverage Liability, UM, UIM, collision, Liability in limited circumstances 
and "road trouble service" 
Scheduled 5 total None 
Drivers 
Scheduled 6 automobiles including the None 
Vehicles 2004 Toyota Tacoma 
Application 5 scheduled drivers as well as Automobile must be used in your 
any permissive drivers and the business and must be one which 
6 scheduled automobiles as you do not own; is not registered 
described in the Declarations in your name; and is not leased or 
rented to you for more than 90 
consecutive days 
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In the context of the Endorsement providing coverage for "bodily injury" and 
"property damage" liability under the CGL Policy, "but only if you do not have any 
other insurance available to you which affords the same or similar coverage[,]" the 
term "similar" modifies "coverage."  The circuit court concluded that "[d]ue to the 
$700,000 difference in coverage between the two policies . . . the coverage 
provided by the two policies is not 'similar.'" See Motors Ins. Corp. v. Bodie, 770 
F. Supp. 547, 550 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (holding the motors policy is not enough like 
the financial policies to be found similar, "they provide different limits for third 
party liability . . . likely to be the most important and significant difference in the 
eyes of the insured"); Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin, 671 A.2d 798, 801 (R.I. 
1996) (finding the disparity in coverage between the policies precluded any 
interpretation that they represented similar insurance as intended by the policy 
language). 
Here, the Endorsement coverage differs from that of the Auto Policy in not only 
the amount of coverage, but also the type of coverage provided, as well as its 
application. Therefore, the policies do not afford "similar coverage" as 
contemplated in the Endorsement.  Accordingly, we find the circuit court properly 
granted the Benjamins' motion for summary judgment.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the circuit court properly determined that Pee 
Dee's CGL Policy provided coverage in addition to that disbursed under the Auto 
Policy. Accordingly, the ruling of the circuit court is 
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
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LOCKEMY, J.: In this appeal from a condemnation action, David Powell argues 
the circuit court erred in granting the South Carolina Department of 
Transportation's (SCDOT) motion for partial summary judgment.  We affirm. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 27, 2010, SCDOT filed a notice of condemnation acquiring 0.183 acres 
of a 2.51 acre tract of unimproved land owned by Powell at the northeast corner of 
Old Socastee Highway and Emory Road in Horry County.  The acquisition 
occurred in conjunction with a highway improvement project involving nearby 
Highway 17. SCDOT offered Powell $72,000 for the condemned property.  
Powell rejected SCDOT's offer and requested a jury trial to determine just 
compensation. 
Prior to the condemnation, Powell's property was accessible from Highway 17 via 
Emory Road.  As a result of SCDOT's highway improvement project, the 
intersection of Emory Road and Highway 17 was closed and Powell's property was 
accessible only from Highway 17 via an entrance one mile north of his property on 
to Old Socastee Highway. Powell's property was taken for the purpose of 
converting the corner of Emory Road and Old Socastee to a curve.  Prior to the 
start of trial, SCDOT changed its road plan.  As a result of the change, Old 
Socastee Highway would no longer extend to the entrance to Highway 17, but 
would dead-end into a cul-de-sac just north of Powell's property.  In order to access 
Powell's property from Highway 17 after the road change motorists would have to 
travel a longer distance (roughly 2 miles).   
On March 14, 2013, SCDOT submitted the revised appraisal report of its real 
estate valuation expert, Corbin Haskell, outlining his opinion of just compensation 
under SCDOT's changed road plan.  Whereas Haskell had assessed no damages to 
Powell's remaining property in any of his three prior reports, in his fourth report 
Haskell determined Powell's remaining property had been damaged fifty percent as 
a result of the taking, and he was entitled to compensation in the amount of 
$517,000. 
One week later, SCDOT submitted a fifth appraisal report from Haskell.  As he did 
in his first three reports, Haskell determined there were no damages to the 
remainder of Powell's property.  On the cover of his report, Haskell included the 
following disclaimer: "I have been requested to revise my appraisal since legal
counsel advises that the reconfiguration of the roadways does not constitute 
damages to the remainder in this case.  Therefore, there are no damages to the 
subject as the property will have full ingress/egress via an adjoining road 'after' the 
acquisition." 
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On March 25, 2013, SCDOT filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of 
diminution in the value of Powell's remaining property caused by the loss of access 
to Highway 17. SCDOT asserted Powell's property did not abut Highway 17 and 
he had no private property right with respect to that road. SCDOT maintained 
Powell's easements with respect to the public roads his property abutted had not 
been disturbed by the project. Additionally, SCDOT requested the court exclude 
damages to the remainder of Powell's property caused by loss of visibility from
Highway 17. At the hearing on SCDOT's motion, Powell's counsel requested 
SCDOT convert its motion to one of partial summary judgment to accommodate 
an appeal. SCDOT agreed to do so. In a May 14, 2013 order, the circuit court 
granted SCDOT's motion for partial summary judgment.  Citing Hardin v. South 
Carolina Department of Transportation, 371 S.C. 598, 641 S.E.2d 437 (2007), the 
court found Powell's loss of access was not compensable and excluded any 
evidence regarding change in access from the trial.  The court declined to rule on 
the issue of loss of visibility. Powell's subsequent Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to 
alter or amend was denied.  This appeal followed.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the 
same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary 
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 
488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002).  In determining whether a genuine issue of 
fact exists, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Sauner v. Pub. Serv. 
Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003).
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Hardin
Powell argues the circuit court erred in finding our supreme court's holding in 
Hardin v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, 371 S.C. 598, 641 S.E.2d 
437 (2007), an inverse condemnation case, prevents the consideration of access 
damages to remaining property in direct condemnation actions.   
Under South Carolina's Constitution, "private property shall not be taken for public 
use . . . without 'just compensation' being first made for the property."  S.C. Const. 
art. I, § 13(A). "In determining just compensation, only the value of the property 
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to be taken, any diminution in the value of the landowner's remaining property, and 
any benefits as provided in § 28-2-360 may be considered."  S.C. Code Ann. § 28-
2-370 (2007). 
In order for the landowner to be compensated fully, the 
government must "put the owners in as good position 
pecuniarily as if the use of their property had not been 
taken. They are entitled to have the full equivalent of the 
value of such use at the time of the taking paid 
contemporaneously with the taking."
S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Faulkenberry, 337 S.C. 140, 148, 522 S.E.2d 822, 826 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (quoting Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 344, 47 S.Ct. 611 
(1927)). 
In Hardin, the plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation action against SCDOT 
alleging the closure of a break in the median of an abutting highway deprived the 
traffic leaving their properties of the ability to cross the highway and constituted a 
taking. 371 S.C. at 603, 641 S.E.2d at 440.  The trial court ruled the plaintiffs 
suffered a compensable taking, and the court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 603, 641 
S.E.2d at 440. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and found there 
was no taking. Id. at 610, 641 S.E.2d at 444. 
Prior to Hardin, "a landowner's ability to recover damages as a result of a re-
configuration of road access depended on the location of his land with reference to 
the road vacated and the effect of the vacation on his rights as an abutting 
landowner." Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 391 S.C. 429, 433, 
706 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2011) (citing City of Rock Hill v. Cothran, 209 S.C. 357, 40 
S.E.2d 239 (1946)). "The Cothran [c]ourt held a landowner is not entitled to 
recover damages unless he has sustained a 'special injury,' which is an injury 
different in kind and not merely in degree from that suffered by the public at 
large." Id. (citing Cothran, 209 S.C. at 368-69, 40 S.E.2d at 243-44). "In Hardin,
the [c]ourt abandoned the 'special injury' analysis which previously existed in this 
state's jurisprudence, and specified that the focus in these cases should be how any 
road re-configuration affects a property owner's easements."  Id. (citing Hardin, 
371 S.C. at 609, 641 S.E.2d at 443).
Pursuant to Hardin, "a property owner in South Carolina has an easement for 
access to and from any public road that abuts his property, regardless of whether he 
has access to and from an additional public road."  371 S.C. at 606, 641 S.E.2d at 
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442. A property owner "also has an easement for access to and from the public 
road system." Id.  The Hardin court held 
[a]s long as the owner has access to and from the 
remainder of the road that continues to abut his property, 
his easement with respect to that road remains intact. 
Further, as long as a landowner still has access to the 
public road system, this easement is unaffected.  This 
reasoning is in line with the notion that a landowner has 
no right to access abutting roads in more than one 
direction. 
Id. at 607, 641 S.E.2d at 442 (footnote omitted).  The Hardin court found the 
plaintiffs continued to have a means of ingress and egress from the highway and 
the public road system, and therefore, their property rights had not been disturbed.  
371 S.C. at 610, 641 S.E.2d at 444.
Here, Powell argues the issue of admissibility of evidence relating to the increased 
remoteness and complexity of access to his property resulting from the SCDOT 
road project is essential to the determination of just compensation.  He asserts that 
because his property is zoned "highway commercial," the ease of access to his 
property affects its value.  Powell contends the route to his property is no longer 
visible to northbound travelers on Highway 17 and is only accessible indirectly.   
Powell further maintains that had the legislature intended to prevent consideration 
of any particular evidence of diminution in value to remaining property, it could 
have inserted limitation language into the Eminent Domain Procedure Act.  
Instead, Powell notes, section 28-2-370 provides any diminution in value of a 
landowner's remaining property is to be considered in determining just 
compensation.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-370 (2007) ("In determining just 
compensation, only the value of the property to be taken, any diminution in the 
value of the landowner's remaining property, and any benefits as provided in § 28-
2-360 may be considered."). 
Powell argues the circuit court's reliance on Hardin is improper.  In Hardin, our 
supreme court held the first step in determining if a taking occurred is to look at 
the property right the plaintiff held prior to the government action for which the 
plaintiff complained.  371 S.C. at 609, 641 S.E.2d at 443. Next, the court must 
determine whether the government action materially injured the property right such 
that the plaintiff "no longer enjoyed the reasonable means of access to which it was 
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entitled." Hilton Head Auto., LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 394 S.C. 27, 31, 714 
S.E.2d 308, 310 (2011). Powell contends the Hardin analysis is unnecessary in 
direct condemnation cases, like the present case, where a taking has already been 
established. He asserts that pursuant to section 28-2-370, the court must consider 
all evidence of damage to the landowner. 
Conversely, SCDOT argues redesigning highways and redirecting traffic are police 
power regulations. SCDOT asserts any diminution in the value of Powell's
remaining property after the closure of the intersection of Emory Road and 
Highway 17 is an incidental result of a police power of the State, not one of 
eminent domain, and is not compensable.  SCDOT contends the closure of the 
intersection was not a taking that deprived Powell of any pre-existing property 
right. Additionally, SCDOT contends Powell's property still has full access to each 
of the roads it abuts (Emory Road and Old Socastee Highway) and to the general 
system of roads by traveling south on Emory Road.  SCDOT argues the added 
distance is not unreasonable and neither of the easements described in Hardin have 
been taken.
We find Hardin is not applicable to the present case. Hardin is an inverse 
condemnation case which does not involve the physical appropriation of private 
property. Here, the relevant question to consider is whether Powell is entitled to 
compensation for access damages to his remaining property where there was 
physical appropriation of land by SCDOT.   
The factual scenario presented here is similar to that in South Carolina State 
Highway Department v. Carodale Associates, 268 S.C. 556, 235 S.E.2d 127 
(1977). In Carodale, the highway department acquired 0.47 acres of land from the 
landowner for the construction of an exit ramp off Interstate 77 in Richland 
County. 268 S.C. at 560, 235 S.E.2d at 128.  Part of the project also involved the 
relocation of part of Highway 1 upon which the landowner's property abutted.  Id. 
The property was afforded access to the relocated Highway 1 by the construction 
of a connecting street. Id. The supreme court reversed the award of damages to 
the landowner's remaining land attributable to the diversion of traffic previously
passing its property. Id. at 564, 235 S.E.2d at 130. The court declared the State is 
under no duty to maintain a minimum level of traffic flow.  Id. at 561, 235 S.E.2d 
at 128. Further, the Carodale court held 
[c]losing a street inherently produces a diversion of 
traffic and loss of frontage on a viable traffic artery.  
However, these repercussions are not compensable 
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 elements of damage.  Succinctly, the restriction of 
ingress or egress to and from one's property is the right 
which must be compensated if infringed when a highway 
is closed by condemnation. 
 
Id. at 561, 235 S.E.2d at 129. 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Powell, we hold the circuit 
court did not err in finding any diminution in value of Powell's property as a result 
of the change in road access is not compensable.  While the circuit court's reliance 
on Hardin was error, pursuant to Carodale, a landowner has no vested rights in the 
continuance of a public highway and in the continuation of maintenance of traffic 
flow past his property.  Therefore, any damage to the remainder of Powell's 
property as a result of the closure of the intersection of Emory Road and Highway 
17 is not compensable.  Moreover, we note Powell has not lost his right of ingress 
or egress to and from his property. Powell had access to Old Socastee Highway 
and Emory Road prior to the road project and will continue to have access to Old 
Socastee Highway and Emory Road following the completion of road project.   
 
II. Wilson 
 
The circuit court found Powell's property was taken for the purpose of rounding the 
intersection of Emory Road and Old Socastee Highway, and SCDOT could have 
eliminated the intersection of Emory Road and Highway 17 without taking 
Powell's property.  On appeal, Powell asserts this finding is not supported by any 
evidence in the record.  Powell argues this finding by the court created an inference 
that could erroneously distinguish the closure of the intersection and the creation of 
the Old Socastee Highway cul-de-sac from the highway project for which the 
present action was filed. Relying on South Carolina State Highway Department v. 
Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970), Powell asserts SCDOT's 
condemnation of a portion of his property was part of its overall road project and 
he is entitled to recover access damages to his remaining property.   
 
In Wilson, the highway department took a portion of Wilson's property in order to 
align a county road running alongside her property with U.S. 15 which her 
property abutted.  254 S.C. at 363, 175 S.E.2d at 393.  Concurrently, the 
department constructed a raised concrete median in the center of U.S. 15 
eliminating her ability to make left turns onto U.S. 15 from her property.  Id. at 
363-64.  The supreme court found that "[w]hile the construction of a median, with 
nothing more, may very well be an exercise of the police power with no resulting 
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compensable damage to an abutting property owner, in the instant case the 
proposed median is only an incidental part of the overall Department plans and 
contemplated construction."  Id. at 368, 175 S.E.2d at 396.  The court held 
[b]ut for such overall construction and relocation, and 
condemnation under the power of eminent domain for 
such purposes, there would have been no median and, of 
course, no damage to the abutting landowner.  It logically 
follows, we think that any damage attributable to the 
planned median is an incidental result of the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain . . . .   
Id. at 369, 175 S.E.2d at 396. 
SCDOT argues Wilson represents a close factual case between acts of eminent 
domain and police power actions for which no compensation is due.  It contends 
the federal courts have formalized a three part rule to distinguish damages resulting 
from a taking and damages resulting from concurrent police power acts in the same 
project. The "Campbell rule," SCDOT asserts, is contained in three cases:
Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. 
v. United States, 200 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1952); and United States v. Pope & Talbot, 
Inc., 293 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1961).   
In Campbell, the United States condemned 1.81 acres of Campbell's land along 
with 1,300 acres owned by other landowners to construct a nitrate plant. 266 U.S. 
at 369. Campbell appealed the refusal of the district court to award him any 
damages for diminution in value to his remaining land.  Id. at 369-70. The 
government did not propose to use Campbell's land for industrial purposes.  
Rather, the plant would be physically located on land taken from the other 
landowners. The Supreme Court held that the proposed use of land by the 
government taken from others did not constitute a taking of Campbell's property.  
266 U.S. at 371. It noted that, if the neighboring landowners had put their land to 
the identical use that the government proposed, Campbell would have no right to
prevent it. Id. at 371-72. In summary, the court stated,
[t]he rule supported by better reason and the weight of 
authority is that the just compensation assured by the 
Fifth Amendment to an owner, a part of whose land is 
taken for public use, does not include the diminution in 
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value of the remainder caused by the acquisition and use 
of adjoining lands of others for the same undertaking. 
 
Id. at 372. 
 
The Fourth Circuit in West Virginia Pulp & Paper distinguished Campbell and 
awarded compensation for damages to the remainder of the condemnee's property 
for the diminution in value to two other contiguous tracts owned by the 
condemnee.  200 F.2d at 103. The court noted that just compensation "includes not 
only the market value of that part of the tract appropriated, but the damage to the 
remainder resulting from that taking, embracing, of course, injury due to the use to 
which the part appropriated is to be devoted." Id. at 102 (quoting United States v. 
Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 183 (1911)). 
 
The Ninth Circuit in Pope & Talbot, established a corollary rule to Campbell. 
There, the United States had taken part of Pope & Talbot's land and the land of 
other owners for a dam project.  293 F.2d at 823.  The land taken from Pope & 
Talbot was flooded along with the other lands. Id. In addition, the remaining Pope 
& Talbot land suffered a loss of accessibility due to having to drive around the lake 
instead of straight across its bed.  Id. at 823-24.  The Court held three elements are 
necessary to negate the application of Campbell: indispensability, substantiality, 
and inseparability. Id. at 825. The Court found (1) the land taken from the 
condemnee landowner was indispensable to the dam project; (2) the land taken 
constituted a substantial part of the tract devoted to the project; and (3) the 
damages resulting to the land not taken from the use of the land taken were 
inseparable from the damages to the land not taken flowing from the condemnor 
government's use of its adjoining land in the dam project.  Id. 
 
We agree with SCDOT that it could have eliminated the intersection without 
taking part of Powell's property.  Powell's property was taken for the purpose of 
rounding the intersection of Emory Road and Old Socastee Highway, not for the 
Highway 17 intersection closure.  While the intersection closure and the taking of 
Powell's property were part of the same SCDOT highway improvement project, the 
relevant question to consider is whether the taking of Powell's property was 
necessary for the intersection closure.  In light of the cases discussed above, we 
find the taking of Powell's property was only an incidental result of the closure and 
was not indispensable to and inseparable from the overall project.  We further hold 
the taking of Powell's property was not a substantial part of the overall road 
project. 
58 

  
 
 
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's grant of SCDOT's motion for partial summary judgment.   
FEW, C.J., and THOMAS, J., concur.   
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LOCKEMY, J.: Boisha Wofford and Kaelyn Wofford (Claimants) appeal the 
Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's order 
finding Brian Wofford was not acting within the course and scope of his 
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employment at the time of his death under an exception to the "going and coming 
rule."1  We affirm.   
FACTS
Wofford, the former Superintendent of the Parks and Recreation Department for 
the City of Spartanburg (the City), died in a motorcycle accident in Moore, South 
Carolina. Wofford was on his way from his mother's home in Moore to one of the 
City's recreational centers. The accident occurred around 11:15 a.m.   
At the hearing before the single commissioner, the City's aquatics director, Tracey 
Ballew, recalled calling Wofford on the morning of the accident to ask him to meet 
her at the City's swim center to sign some forms and retrieve a key from the 
Department's C.C. Woodson Recreational Center.  Ballew stated Wofford told her 
he "was going directly to [C.C. Woodson Recreational Center] to get the key, and 
then coming to the Swim Center."  
Scott Page, the City's Parks Manager, testified Wofford often worked out of other 
recreation centers, including the C.C. Woodson Recreational Center. Similarly, 
Deborah McClary, an administrative assistant, stated Wofford often worked at 
several different locations, including the Department's main office, the four 
recreational centers, the swim center, and the City's parks.   
Mitchell Kennedy, the City's Director of Community Services and Wofford's
supervisor, testified Wofford's job duties involved traveling between the various 
recreational centers and parks.  Kennedy testified he often communicated with 
employees via phone, e-mail, and text, even when he or the employees were not at 
work. Kennedy explained, "I have communicated with employees, based upon 
certain circumstances, where I knew that they were not at work and I may have a 
task . . . . So I would not consider [them] on the job if I knew that . . . person was 
not at work." Kennedy stated it was not unusual for Wofford to fulfill requests like 
Ballew's to retrieve keys and sign forms. Additionally, Kennedy explained it was 
common for Wofford to travel among the various recreational centers, parks, and 
swim centers. According to Kennedy, Wofford had discretion in setting his work 
hours. 
Janice Littlejohn, Wofford's mother, testified Wofford came to her house in Moore 
on the morning of the accident to pick up his motorcycle, which he stored at her 
1 Boisha is Wofford's surviving spouse and Kaelyn is Wofford's surviving child.   
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home.  Littlejohn stated her home was in the opposite direction of Wofford's office.  
Littlejohn recalled Wofford had two business-related phone calls while he was
visiting her. Wofford was at Littlejohn's home for approximately three hours.  
When Wofford left Littlejohn's home, he told her he was on his way to work.   
The single commissioner concluded Wofford did not suffer a compensable injury 
because Claimants failed to show his accident arose out of and in the course of his 
employment as Wofford was not working at the time of his accident. Further, the 
commissioner found the remote communication that Wofford had with other City 
employees did not rise to the level such that his actions were within the course and 
scope of his employment.  Even if his communication made his actions within the 
course and scope of his employment, the commissioner concluded Wofford's
decision to drive to his mother's home to visit her for three hours and pick up his 
motorcycle resulted in a substantial deviation from his employment.   
Finally, the commissioner found there were no applicable exceptions to the going 
and coming rule.  The commissioner noted Wofford's accident occurred on the way 
to work, and Wofford did not have any work-related duties to perform on the way 
to work nor was he under the control of the City.  The commissioner also found the 
special errand exception to the going and coming rule was inapplicable because 
Wofford was not charged with a task on his way to work.  The commissioner 
further found Wofford was going to work to perform his typical job duties and it 
was common for Wofford to work at his office, the recreational centers, or at a 
City event.
The parties cross-appealed to the Appellate Panel of the Commission.  On appeal, 
Claimants argued two points to reverse the single commissioner.  First, Claimants 
asserted Wofford was working while he was visiting his mother because he was 
emailing and calling employees.  Second, Claimants maintained Wofford's
accident met an exception to the going and coming rule because he was on a 
special errand to retrieve keys for Ballew.  The Appellate Panel affirmed the single 
commissioner's findings in full.  This appeal followed.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act establishes the substantial 
evidence standard for judicial review of decisions by the Commission."  Murphy v. 
Owens Corning, 393 S.C. 77, 81, 710 S.E.2d 454, 456 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing S.C. 
Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2014)). "Under the substantial evidence standard of 
review, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to 
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the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse where the decision 
is affected by an error of law." Id. at 81-82, 710 S.E.2d at 456. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Two Issue Rule 
Initially, the City claims the two issue rule bars Claimants' appeal because the 
Appellate Panel denied their claim on multiple grounds, but the Claimants 
appealed only one of those grounds. The City asserts even if this court reverses the 
Appellate Panel's findings on the going and coming rule, Claimants could not 
succeed on appeal because the Appellate Panel found Wofford's trip to his mother's
house was a substantial deviation from his employment.  Second, the City 
maintains Wofford did not meet an exception to the going and coming rule. 
Initially, the City notes Claimants have not indicated which exception to the going 
and coming rule applies.  Further, the City argues none of the exceptions apply 
because Wofford was on his way to work to perform his normal job duties and 
merely volunteered to pick up a key for Ballew. 
Claimants assert the two issue rule does not apply here. Claimants argue that if 
Wofford was engaged in a special task for his employer and met an exception 
under the going and coming rule, then the Appellate Panel's other rulings would be 
"invalidated." We find the two issue rule does not apply here. 
"Under the two issue rule, where a decision is based on more than one ground, the 
appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the 
unappealed ground will become the law of the case."  Jones v. Lott, 387 S.C. 339, 
346, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010). "It should be noted that although cases generally 
have discussed the 'two issue' rule in the context of the appellate treatment of 
general jury verdicts, the rule is applicable under other circumstances on appeal, 
including affirmance of orders of trial courts." Anderson v. S.C. Dep't of Highways 
& Pub. Transp., 322 S.C. 417, 420 n.1, 472 S.E.2d 253, 255 n.1 (1996).   
For example, if a court directs a verdict for a defendant 
on the basis of the defenses of statute of limitations and 
contributory negligence, the order would be affirmed 
under the "two issue" rule if the plaintiff failed to appeal 
both grounds or if one of the grounds required 
affirmance. 
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Id. 
We find the two issue rule does not apply here because Claimants presented two 
reasons why their claim was compensable—(1) Wofford had worked all morning 
by communicating remotely with other City employees and (2) he met an 
exception to the going and coming rule once he left his mother's home.  The 
Appellate Panel found Wofford's communications did not rise to the level that 
would bring his actions at his mother's home within the course and scope of his 
employment, and even if they did, he substantially deviated from his employment 
by visiting his mother in Moore.  Further, the Appellate Panel found no applicable 
exceptions to the going and coming rule applied because retrieving the key and 
signing forms for Ballew was within Wofford's ordinary job duties.  Although 
Claimants did not appeal the Appellate Panel's ruling that Wofford's phone calls 
and e-mails to other employees at his mother's home did not rise to the level such 
that his actions were within the scope of his employment, they did appeal the 
Appellate Panel's finding that Wofford did not meet an exception to the "going and 
coming rule" once he left his mother's home.  We find the Appellate Panel's order 
addresses two different points in time—(1) Wofford's actions at his mother's home 
and (2) his actions when he was on his way to work. 
II. Exception to Going and Coming Rule 
Claimants argue the Appellate Panel erred in finding Wofford was acting outside 
the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death because his claim 
fell within an exception to the going and coming rule.  Claimants assert that once 
Wofford left his mother's home, he was in the process of executing a specific task 
for the City—retrieving a spare key from a recreational center.  Thus, Claimants 
maintain Wofford was performing an act in connection with his duties as the 
superintendent of the Department.  We disagree.
Generally, an employee going to or coming from the place where he works is not 
engaged in performing a service growing out of and incidental to his employment, 
and thus, an injury from an accident at such time does not arise out of and in the 
course of his employment.  Medlin v. Upstate Plaster Serv., 329 S.C. 92, 95, 495 
S.E.2d 447, 449 (1998). However, South Carolina has recognized five exceptions 
to this rule. Among these are where (1) "the means of transportation is provided 
by the employer, or the time that is consumed is paid for or included in the wages;" 
(2) "the employee, on his way to or from his work, is still charged with some duty 
or task in connection with his employment;" (3) the way to work is inherently 
dangerous and is either the exclusive way or is constructed and maintained by the 
64 

  
 
 
 
employer; (4) the injury occurred in close proximity to the workplace and there is 
an express or implied requirement that the employee use that approach in going to 
and coming from work; and (5) an employee is injured "while performing a special 
task, service, mission, or errand for his employer, even before or after customary 
working hours, or on a day on which he does not ordinarily work."  Id. at 95-96, 
495 S.E.2d at 449. 
Under the duty or task exception, "an employee will not be precluded from 
receiving benefits where the employee, on his way to or from his work, is charged 
with some duty or task in connection with his employment."  Whitworth v. Window 
World, Inc., 377 S.C. 637, 641, 661 S.E.2d 333, 336 (2008). In Whitworth, a 
window installer loaded his equipment onto his truck and proceeded to the jobsite 
to install windows. Id. at 639, 661 S.E.2d at 335. After stopping for a drink, the 
window installer was involved in an automobile accident.  Id. The supreme court 
held the window installer failed to show he was charged with a work-related duty 
or task under the duty or task exception of the going and coming rule because the 
primary purpose of his trip was a personal objective—to travel to the place where 
he would perform his work.  Id. at 641, 661 S.E.2d at 336. Further, the court noted 
he did not have any work-related duties to perform on his way to work, he was not 
under the control of his employer, and he was free to conduct personal business.  
Id. 
Additionally, the special task exception "allows compensation where an employee 
sustains an injury while performing a special task, service, mission, or errand for 
his employer, even before or after customary working hours, or on a day on which 
he does not ordinarily work."  Gray v. Club Grp., Ltd., 339 S.C. 173, 189, 528 
S.E.2d 435, 443 (Ct. App. 2000). In Bickley v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 
the supreme court held an electrical lineman's death arose out of and in the scope 
of his employment because he was on a special errand or mission for his employer.  
259 S.C. 463, 471, 192 S.E.2d 866, 870 (1972).  There, a lineman was called to 
repair storm damage to electrical lines in Charleston.  Id. at 467, 192 S.E.2d at 868. 
He left his home in Columbia at 3:30 a.m. Id. The lineman and his crew worked 
until 11:30 p.m. and decided to return to Columbia.  Id. at 467-68, 192 S.E.2d at 
868. After arriving in Columbia and leaving work at 3:30 a.m. the following 
morning, the lineman drove home and crashed into a truck.  Id. at 468, 192 S.E.2d 
at 868. The collision killed the lineman. Id. The court explained the lineman was 
entitled to compensation from the time he left his home until his return because he
was obligated to make emergency calls or perform services at times other than his 
regular working hours and he was on a special errand or mission for the employer.  
Id. at 470, 192 S.E.2d at 870. 
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In McDaniel v. Bus Terminal Restaurant Management Corp., the supreme court 
held a cook who was injured in an automobile accident on the way home from an 
employee meeting did not suffer a compensable injury under the "special errand 
exception." 271 S.C. 299, 301-03, 247 S.E.2d 321, 322-23 (1978).  The court 
concluded that unlike the lineman in Bickley, the cook was not called to perform an 
emergency service and the employee meetings were not unusual or "special."  Id. 
The court found the cook's attendance at the employee meetings was a normal, 
customary aspect of her job and she did not perform a special errand by attending 
the meeting.  Id. Further, the court noted she had not performed any service to her 
employer while enroute to or from her place of employment and the trip was not a 
substantial part of the service for which she was employed.  Id. 
We find substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's finding that Wofford's
accident did not meet an exception to the going and coming rule.  See Lark v. Bi-
Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135-36, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306-07 (1981) (providing this 
court must affirm the findings of fact made by the Appellate Panel if they are 
supported by substantial evidence). Although we agree with the City that 
Claimants have not specifically indicated which exception was met, the Claimants 
generally argue Wofford's death arose out of and in the course of his employment 
because he met either the duty or task exception or the special errand exception.  
For example, Claimants argue Wofford was "in the process of executing a specific 
task given [to] him by Tracy Ballew" and the "task was one of value to the 
employer."  Additionally, Claimants assert Wofford was "embarking on [an] 
errand" to retrieve the spare key for Ballew and he had "no discretion" to stop on 
his way to work. The Appellate Panel also ruled on these two exceptions. 
Accordingly, we analyze Claimants' arguments under these two exceptions. 
First, we agree with the Appellate Panel's finding that the duty or task exception 
did not apply. Similar to Whitworth, the primary purpose of Wofford's trip was a 
personal objective to travel to the recreational center where he performed his work.  
See 377 S.C. at 641, 661 S.E.2d at 336 (holding a window installer did not meet an 
exception to the going and coming rule when he was involved in an accident 
transporting a piece of equipment to a job site).  We note retrieving the key was 
Wofford's first task of the day and three employees, including Wofford's
immediate supervisor, testified it was common for Wofford to work out of his 
office, the various recreational centers, and the swim center. Kennedy, Wofford's
supervisor, also testified retrieving a key and signing forms for Ballew were within 
Wofford's typical job responsibilities.  Thus, Kennedy and the other employees' 
testimonies support the Appellate Panel's finding Wofford was "merely on his way 
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to work to engage in his typical job responsibilities," which included retrieving a 
key and signing forms for Ballew, and he was not charged with any work-related 
duties at the time of the accident.  See Medlin, 329 S.C. at 95, 495 S.E.2d at 449 
(stating an employee going to or coming from the place where he works is not 
engaged in performing a service growing out of and incidental to his employment, 
and thus, an injury from an accident at such time does not arise out of and in the 
course of his employment).   
Second, we agree with the Appellate Panel's finding the special errand exception 
did not apply. Similar to McDaniel, Wofford was on his way to work to perform 
his typical job duties like retrieving keys and signing forms, and thus, he did not 
perform a special errand by driving to the swim center.  Compare McDaniel, 271 
S.C. at 303, 247 S.E.2d at 323 (providing a cook did not suffer a compensable 
injury under the special errand exception when injured in an automobile accident 
on her way home from an employee meeting because the meeting was a normal, 
customary aspect of her job and she did not perform a special errand by attending 
the meeting), with Bickley, 259 S.C. at 470, 192 S.E.2d at 870 (holding a lineman 
was entitled to compensation because he was obligated to make emergency calls or 
perform services at times other than his regular working hours and he went on a 
special errand for the employer).   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Appellate Panel's finding Wofford was not 
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death. 
AFFIRMED. 
FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur. 
67 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
  
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 
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REVERSED 
John S. Nichols and Blake Alexander Hewitt, both of 
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Jennings, both of Joye Law Firm, LLP, of North 
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Catherine Holland Chase, all of Young Clement Rivers, 
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LOCKEMY, J.: In this appeal from the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina 
Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel), Ricky Rhame argues the 
Appellate Panel erred in finding his claim for a repetitive trauma injury to his back 
was barred by the statute of limitations.  We reverse.
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Charleston County School District (the District) employed Rhame as a heating 
and air conditioning technician from 1987 to 2009.  His job frequently required 
him to lift heating and air conditioning equipment.  According to Rhame, some of 
this equipment weighed as much as one hundred pounds.   
Rhame admitted he began experiencing off-and-on back pain as far back as 1994 
or 1995. Additionally, in 2006, Rhame developed a problem with his neck due to 
his employment and underwent cervical fusion surgery.  After speaking with 
someone with the District about the neck problem, Rhame was told they would not 
provide benefits.  The District sent Rhame a follow-up letter confirming the denial 
of benefits for his neck injury. Rhame did not contact anyone else concerning the 
incident. 
On September 29, 2009, Rhame filed a Form 50 with the Commission.  He alleged 
that on May 4, 2009, he sustained a back injury from repetitively lifting heavy air 
conditioning units. Rhame amended the form shortly after filing to specifically 
"reflect repetitive trauma for the nature of the injury."
The District answered by filing a Form 51 on October 7, 2009.  The District denied 
Rhame had sustained an injury by accident.  Additionally, the District asserted 
Rhame had not complied with the Workers' Compensation Act's (the Act's) notice 
requirement and the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.  The District 
contended that in 1994 or 1995, as soon as Rhame realized he was having back 
pain caused by his job, Rhame knew or should have known he had a compensable 
injury and brought a claim for benefits. Rhame explained his delay in filing a 
workers' compensation claim, stating (1) his back pain was off-and-on and was 
never the result of a single discreet or identifiable injury; (2) he had a fear of losing 
his job; (3) his ability to complete his work-related duties was not affected until 
2009; and (4) he was ignorant of the workers' compensation system and the 
concept of repetitive trauma injuries until retaining counsel in 2009.   
The single commissioner heard the case on December 3, 2009, and issued an order 
in February 2010 finding Rhame's claim was not barred by the statute of 
limitations and awarding benefits for temporary total disability and medical 
treatment.   
On March 1, 2010, the District filed a Form 30 requesting a review of the single 
commissioner's decision by the Appellate Panel.  Both parties submitted briefs.  
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The Appellate Panel conducted a hearing in May 2010, and in an order filed 
August 6, 2010, the Appellate Panel reversed the single commissioner's decision.  
The Appellate Panel found Rhame was aware of his "back injury" in 1994 or 1995 
and he did not file a claim within two years of when he knew or should have 
known that his claim was compensable.  The Appellate Panel also found Rhame 
"showed awareness of the workers' compensation system" by trying to file a claim
for his 2006 neck injury and he delayed bringing the present claim out of fear of 
losing his job. 
Rhame filed a petition for rehearing on September 8, 2010, which the Appellate 
Panel dismissed on September 21, 2010.  On October 21, 2010, Rhame served and 
filed a notice of appeal with this court. 
This court dismissed Rhame's appeal, finding the notice of appeal was not filed 
within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim.  Rhame v. 
Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 399 S.C. 477, 481-83, 732 S.E.2d 202, 204-05 (Ct. 
App. 2012), rev'd, 412 S.C. 273, 772 S.E.2d 159 (2015). This court held motions 
for rehearing were not permitted before the Appellate Panel on review of a single 
commissioner's decision.  Id. at 483, 732 S.E.2d at 205. The supreme court 
granted Rhame's petition for a writ of certiorari and held Rhame's motion for 
rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the 
notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion.  
Rhame v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 412 S.C. 273, 772 S.E.2d 159, 160 (2015). 
The supreme court remanded to this court to consider Rhame's appeal.  Id. at 279, 
772 S.E.2d at 162. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act establishes the substantial 
evidence standard for judicial review of decisions by the [Appellate Panel]."  
Murphy v. Owens Corning, 393 S.C. 77, 81, 710 S.E.2d 454, 456 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(citing S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2011)).  "Under the substantial evidence 
standard of review, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
[Appellate Panel] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may 
reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law."  Id. at 81-82, 710 S.E.2d 
at 456. "Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence 
viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence that, considering the 
record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the 
administrative agency reached in order to justify its action."  Taylor v. S.C. Dep't of 
Motor Vehicles, 368 S.C. 33, 36, 627 S.E.2d 751, 752 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting 
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S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 519, 613 S.E.2d 544, 547 
(2005)). "The mere possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the 
evidence does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence."  
Olson v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 379 S.C. 57, 63, 663 S.E.2d 497, 
501 (Ct. App. 2008). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Rhame argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding his claim for a repetitive trauma
injury to his back was barred by the statute of limitations.  Specifically, Rhame 
asserts the Appellate Panel erred in (1) finding the first time Rhame experienced 
back pain was a back injury; (2) applying the statute of limitations; and (3) finding 
Rhame was aware of the workers' compensation system by no later than 2006. 
I. Back Injury 
Rhame contends the Appellate Panel's characterization of his first experience of 
back pain as a back injury is inconsistent with the gradual nature of a repetitive 
trauma and is not supported by the evidence in the record. We agree. 
The Appellate Panel found Rhame (1) was aware he "had a back injury related to 
his is job . . . in 1994 or 1995"; (2) "continued to receive pain medications, 
injections, and physical therapy . . . since 1994 or 1995"; and (3) "missed days 
from work on and off from 1994 and 1995 due to ongoing pain in his back."  
The District argues these findings are supported by Rhame's testimony regarding 
his back pain. Rhame asserts the Appellate Panel's decision did not account for the 
gradual and progressive nature of repetitive trauma injuries.  Rhame contends the 
evidence in the record suggests not that he suffered an injury in 1994 or 1995 but 
that he began at that time to have off-and-on back pain which he knew was caused 
by his work. 
Section 42-1-172(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015) defines "repetitive trauma
injury" as "an injury which is gradual in onset and caused by the cumulative effects 
of repetitive traumatic events."  In Schurlknight v. City of North Charleston, 352 
S.C. 175, 178, 574 S.E.2d 194, 195 (2002), our supreme court held repetitive 
trauma injuries have a gradual onset caused by the cumulative effect of repetitive 
traumatic events or "mini-accidents."  The court noted "it is difficult to determine 
the date an accident occurs in a repetitive trauma case because there is no definite 
time of injury." Id.
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We find the substantial evidence in the record does not support the Appellate 
Panel's finding Rhame suffered a back injury in 1994 or 1995.  The evidence in the 
record indicates Rhame began experiencing back pain in 1994 or 1995, not that he 
suffered an injury in 1994 or 1995. 
Rhame admitted he began having back pain in 1994 and 1995 and he knew this 
pain was work-related. Rhame testified the pain was "off-and-on" and he would 
sometimes seek medical attention where he would receive medication for pulled 
muscles and return to work after his back pain eased.  The evidence in the record 
describes progressive and intermittent back pain that took Rhame to the doctor in 
either 1994 or 1995, as well as for visits in 2001, 2002, 2006, and 2007.  
According to Rhame, his back pain retained its off-and-on character until May 
2009, when he moved a particularly heavy unit and "couldn't even stand up 
straight" afterwards. Following the May 2009 incident, Rhame's doctors told him
he could no longer work. Rhame testified that since May 2009, he has experienced 
a constant, throbbing pain from his lower back down the front of his right leg.  He 
further testified he cannot walk more than a block, stand upright for any substantial 
length of time, put on his pants, get clothes out of the dryer, or tie his shoes 
without pain.
The Appellate Panel's decision takes an early occurrence of Rhame's back pain and 
finds that occurrence of pain to be an injury.  However, Rhame continued to work 
his same duties for the District for another fifteen years, was never given any light 
duty restrictions, and never missed work for more than "a day or two, here and 
there, for pulled muscles."  The first evidence of the possibility of a permanent 
injury appears in a 2007 notation in Rhame's medical records, which reads "[h]e 
may be at risk because of his job to get lumbar [meaning lower back] problems 
also." The evidence again was that since 1994 or 1995, Rhame was having 
intermittent back pain that was not diagnosed as relating to any permanent injury 
and did not appear to create any permanent restriction on his ability to perform his 
job. This court has previously rejected the argument that a worker with a repetitive 
trauma injury experiences an injury when the worker first experiences adverse 
symptoms. See Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 481, 617 S.E.2d 369, 383 (Ct. App. 
2005) (rejecting the argument that claimant suffered a single injury on the date she 
began to experience problems with her arms and holding the only evidence in the 
record was that claimant suffered a sustained repetitive trauma injury over a period 
of time which later culminated in disability).  Accordingly, we reverse the 
Appellate Panel's finding that Rhame suffered a back injury in 1994 or 1995.
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II. Statute of Limitations 
Next, Rhame argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding he failed to file his claim
within the statute of limitations.  We agree.
"For a 'repetitive trauma injury' . . . , the right to compensation is barred unless a 
claim is filed with the commission within two years after the employee knew or 
should have known that his injury is compensable but no more than seven years 
after the last date of injurious exposure."  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (2015).
As stated above, repetitive trauma injuries have a gradual onset caused by the 
cumulative effect of repetitive traumatic events.  Determining the date an accident 
occurs in a repetitive trauma case is difficult because repetitive trauma injuries, by 
their nature, lack a definite time of injury. 
We find the substantial evidence in the record does not support the Appellate 
Panel's finding Rhame failed to file his claim within two years of when he knew or 
should have known his claim was compensable.  The record contains no evidence 
Rhame was aware he was suffering from a repetitive trauma injury prior to May 
2009.1  While Rhame experienced off-and-on back pain since 1994 or 1995, it was 
not until May 2009 that he began experiencing constant, throbbing pain that 
interfered with his ability to perform his job.  Furthermore, it was not until May 
2009 that Rhame was diagnosed with disc disruption and lumbar radiculitis and 
told by his doctor he could not work. For the foregoing reasons, we find Rhame 
was not aware his back injury was compensable until May 2009.  Therefore, his 
Form 50, filed in September 2009, was timely pursuant to section 42-15-40.  
Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Panel's decision and reinstate the single 
commissioner's award of benefits. 
III. Rhame's Awareness of the Workers' Compensation System 
Rhame argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding he was aware of the workers'
compensation system by no later than 2006.  Based upon our decision to reverse 
above, we need not address this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (finding an 
1 We note that although a 2007 notation in Rhame's medical records indicated he 
may be at risk of developing lumbar problems, Rhame was not diagnosed with an 
injury at that time.   
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appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is 
dispositive). 
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Appellate Panel's finding Rhame's claim for a repetitive trauma
injury to his back was barred by the statute of limitations. 
REVERSED. 

FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.  
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WILLIAMS, J.:  In this civil matter, Betty Fisher appeals the circuit court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Bessie Huckabee, Kay Passailague Slade, Sandra 
Byrd, and Peter Kouten (collectively "Respondents").  Fisher argues the court erred 
in (1) holding she lacked standing to bring a survival action against Respondents 
on behalf of her deceased aunt as a "real representative"; (2) failing to find Kouten 
waived the issue of standing; (3) failing to find she had standing based on equitable 
principles of trust law; (4) failing to find South Carolina public policy supports
giving her third-party standing; (5) granting summary judgment when genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to her claims; (6) failing to rule upon the motion 
to disqualify Kouten as counsel for Huckabee, Slade, and Byrd; and (7) 
considering trial counsel's arguments as factual contentions.  We affirm.  
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Alice Shaw-Baker died testate in Charleston County, South Carolina, at the age of 
79 on February 25, 2009. Originally from San Francisco, California, Shaw-Baker 
enlisted in the Navy and was subsequently stationed in Charleston.  After her 
service, Shaw-Baker worked in accounting-related jobs for several employers in 
the Charleston area, including Charleston Memorial Hospital for over twenty 
years. Shaw-Baker married and divorced twice, and she had no children.   
Shaw-Baker, a passionate advocate for animals, had executed prior wills that left 
the vast majority of her estate to animal welfare and rescue organizations.  Her 
prior wills also included bequests to Huckabee and Slade, who were Shaw-Baker's 
friends and former colleagues at Charleston Memorial Hospital.  In her last will 
and testament, executed on May 21, 2001, Shaw-Baker devised her entire estate to 
Huckabee, Slade, and another former colleague, Byrd.  Shaw-Baker also named 
Slade the sole beneficiary of her state deferred compensation plan and a life 
insurance policy. Further, Shaw-Baker nominated Huckabee as personal 
representative. Huckabee petitioned the probate court for informal probate of the 
will on March 11, 2009. The probate court admitted the will and appointed 
Huckabee as personal representative. 
Shaw-Baker's closest living heir is her niece, Fisher, of Long Beach, California.  
On April 27, 2009, Fisher contested the will and sought removal of Huckabee as 
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personal representative.1  Fisher alleged Huckabee and Slade had unduly 
influenced Shaw-Baker by inducing her to execute the May 21, 2001 will naming 
them the sole beneficiaries of the entire estate—with the exception of a $4,000 
bequest to Byrd—in exchange for the promise they would provide care for Shaw-
Baker such that she could avoid being placed in an assisted living facility.  Fisher 
alleged that, despite their promise, Huckabee and Slade failed to provide adequate 
care for Shaw-Baker, allowing her health and home to deteriorate to the point that 
her grand-niece was appointed as her guardian–conservator in her last year of life.  
Fisher also alleged Kouten, Shaw-Baker's court-appointed guardian ad litem and 
attorney, acted contrary to Shaw-Baker's interests and failed to exercise reasonable 
care in advising her on conservator and estate matters.   
Based on these allegations, Fisher filed the instant lawsuit in circuit court on 
February 23, 2012, as Shaw-Baker's "real representative" under the survivability 
statute.2  In her complaint, Fisher requested damages and attorney's fees, bringing 
causes of action against all Respondents for, inter alia, violation of the Omnibus 
Adult Protection Act3 and breach of fiduciary duty.  Additionally, Fisher asserted a 
legal malpractice claim against Kouten.  
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on December 17, 2012, 
claiming Fisher—as Shaw-Baker's real representative—lacked standing to bring 
this action. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion in a Form 4 order issued 
on May 8, 2013.4  Fisher filed a motion to alter or amend judgment on May 28, 
2013.
In its December 12, 2013 order, the circuit court denied Fisher's motion to alter or 
amend and affirmed its prior order granting Respondents' motion for summary 
judgment.  The court held a real representative could not sue on behalf of a 
1 The will contest is still pending in the probate court.  
2 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-90 (2005).   
3 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 43-35-5 through -595 (2015).  
4 The circuit court made a scrivener's error in this order by granting summary 
judgment to Fisher.  The court corrected this mistake in a September 3, 2013 order, 
in which it granted summary judgment to Respondents.  
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decedent for injuries to his person or personal property under the survivability 
statute. Noting a real representative historically was only able to bring actions 
related to the decedent's real estate, the court found only a personal representative 
could bring those actions. Accordingly, the court concluded Fisher's only remedy 
was to seek removal of Huckabee as personal representative in probate court.  This 
appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment using the same 
standard employed by the circuit court."  Columbia/CSA–HS Greater Columbia 
Healthcare Sys., LP v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 411 
S.C. 557, 560, 769 S.E.2d 847, 848 (2015).  Rule 56(c), SCRCP, provides that 
summary judgment shall be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that . . . no genuine issue [exists] as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  "Determining the proper 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and [the appellate court] reviews 
questions of law de novo." Lambries v. Saluda Cty. Council, 409 S.C. 1, 7, 760 
S.E.2d 785, 788 (2014) (quoting Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 
378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008)).   
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Standing as "Real Representative" 
Fisher contends the circuit court erred in finding she lacked standing to bring 
personal causes of action on behalf of Shaw-Baker as her "real representative" 
under the survivability statute.  According to Fisher, because Huckabee—Shaw-
Baker's personal representative—will not conceivably sue herself and the other 
Respondents, Fisher may bring this action as Shaw-Baker's real representative.  We 
disagree. 
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the [General Assembly]."  Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 
581 (2000). "The [General Assembly]'s intent should be ascertained primarily 
from the plain language of the statute."  Ex parte Cannon, 385 S.C. 643, 655, 685 
S.E.2d 814, 821 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
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Cty. of Aiken, 354 S.C. 18, 22, 579 S.E.2d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2003)).  "If, 
however, the language of the statute gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to 
legislative intent, the construing court looks to the statute's language as a whole in 
light of its manifest purpose." Id. "The construing court may additionally look to 
the legislative history when determining the legislative intent."  Id. 
Section 15-5-90 of the South Carolina Code (2005) provides the following:
Causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries 
and trespasses to and upon real estate and any and all 
injuries to the person or to personal property shall survive 
both to and against the personal or real representative, as
the case may be, of a deceased person . . . . 
Because the language in section 15-5-90 is broad and does not explicitly state 
which causes of action survive to the personal or real representative, we look to the 
legislative intent behind this statute to resolve the question of whether Fisher may 
bring this action on behalf of Shaw-Baker.  See Ferguson v. Charleston Lincoln 
Mercury, Inc., 349 S.C. 558, 564, 564 S.E.2d 94, 97 (2002) (explaining "the 
[survivability] statute's language is broad and ostensibly appears to include almost 
every conceivable cause of action" with few exceptions).5
"At common law, a personal action ex delicto did not survive the death of either 
party." Id. at 564, 564 S.E.2d at 97. In 1859, the General Assembly passed a 
wrongful death statute, a version of Lord Campbell's Act in England, that provided 
a cause of action against a defendant who wrongfully killed a decedent for the 
benefit of certain family members.  Act No. 4480, 1859 S.C. Acts 825–26; see also 
Robert L. Wynn, III, Note, Death of the Head of the Family—Elements of 
Damages Under South Carolina's Lord Campbell's Act, 19 S.C. L. REV. 220, 220– 
21 (1967) (providing a history of wrongful death and survival actions in South 
Carolina). The General Assembly also enacted the first survivability statute in 
1892, stating that "causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries and 
5 We note that some, if not all, of Fisher's causes of action include allegations of 
fraud and deceit, both of which are well-recognized common law exceptions to the 
survivability statute. Ferguson, 349 S.C. at 564, 564 S.E.2d at 97. Therefore, even 
if Fisher had standing, she could not bring these actions on Shaw-Baker's behalf 
under the statute. 
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trespasses to and upon real estate shall survive both to and against the personal or 
real representative (as the case may be) of deceased persons."  Act No. 15, 1892 
S.C. Acts 18 (emphasis added).  Our supreme court later held the wrongful death 
statute did not provide for the survival of a decedent's cause of action for personal 
injuries suffered prior to death for the benefit of his estate. In re Estate of Mayo, 
60 S.C. 401, 413–14, 38 S.E. 634, 637–38 (1901).  Therefore, in 1905, the General 
Assembly amended the survivability statute—which initially covered only real 
property—and inserted the words "and any and all injuries to the person or to 
personal property" after the words "real estate."  Act No. 471, 1905 S.C. Acts 945; 
see also Grainger v. Greenville, Spartanburg & Anderson Ry. Co., 101 S.C. 399, 
403, 85 S.E. 968, 969 (1915) (noting the legislative intent behind the amendment).  
The 1905 change is reflected in the current survivability statute.  See § 15-5-90. 
At common law, real and personal property were two distinct "species" during the 
administration of an estate.  Hull v. Hull, 24 S.C. Eq. (3 Rich. Eq.) 65, 91 (1850). 
Title to a decedent's real property passed directly to his intestate heirs at law or 
devisees. Id. Thus, those individuals succeeding to the real property stood in the 
place of the decedent in regard to his affairs concerning the land and were
sometimes called the "real representatives."  33 C.J.S. Executors and 
Administrators § 2 (2009). 
Legal title to the decedent's personal property vested upon his death with his 
executor or administrator, otherwise referred to as the "personal representative."  
Hull, 24 S.C. Eq. at 91.  A testator, however, could devise title to his real property 
to his personal representative and direct him to sell it to pay off estate debts or 
distribute the sale proceeds to his legatees.  See S.C. Code of 1902 § 2600 (Civ. 
Code); Hull, 24 S.C. Eq. at 91.  Therefore, a real or personal representative, but not 
both, could be vested with title in the decedent's real property. See Hull, 24 S.C. 
Eq. at 91 ("If [real property] is devised, unless devised to the executor, or power is 
given to him to dispose of it, [the executor] has no power to interfere with it, and 
the devisee takes it without his assent.").  
The dichotomy between a personal and real representative is reflected in the 1892 
Act. The General Assembly established the right to pursue survival actions 
involving a decedent's real estate to the "personal or real representative (as the case 
may be)." Act No. 15, 1892 S.C. Acts 18.  The use of the words "as the case may 
be" demonstrates the General Assembly intended that either the personal or real 
representative could pursue a survival action, depending on how the title in real 
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property vested upon the decedent's death.  If the title vested to a testator's personal 
representative, then he would be the proper individual to bring a suit for injuries or 
trespass to the land as its legal owner. See Act No. 15, 1892 S.C. Acts 18. If, on 
the other hand, the title vested in an heir at law or devisee, then he could bring an 
action on behalf of the decedent as the real representative.  See Act No. 15, 1892 
S.C. Acts 18; see also, e.g., Duke v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 71 S.C. 95, 98–99, 50 
S.E. 675, 676 (1905) (holding the decedent's intestate heirs are real representatives 
under the Act). After the 1905 amendment, the General Assembly expanded a 
personal representative's power in survival suits, allowing that person to also bring 
actions regarding injuries to the decedent's person or personal property, while a 
real representative remained constrained to actions related to injury or trespass to 
the decedent's real property.  See Bennett v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 97 
S.C. 27, 29, 81 S.E. 189, 189 (1914) (concluding the 1905 amendment "provides, 
among other things, that causes of action for and in respect to 'any and all injuries 
to the person' shall survive to the personal representative of the deceased" 
(emphasis added)); id. at 30, 81 S.E. at 189 (stating the recovery, if any, in a 
personal survival action goes to the decedent's personal representative to hold as 
assets of the estate). Therefore, based on the legislative history of the survivability 
statute, we find the "real representative"—a decedent's intestate heir or devisee of 
his real property—is a remnant of the 1892 Act and only continued to have 
standing after the 1905 amendment in survival actions involving trespass or injury 
to the decedent's real estate.   
In addition to the legislative history of the survivability statute, we find the current 
version of the South Carolina Probate Code lends support to our conclusion that a 
real representative has no role in a survival suit for injuries to the decedent's
person. In 1986, the General Assembly enacted a modified version of the 
Uniform Probate Code that modernized and made sweeping changes to the state's 
antiquated probate law on which the survivability statute was based.  Act No. 539, 
1986 S.C. Acts 3446 (codified as amended at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-1-100 through 
-7-1106 (Supp. 2014)); see also generally S. Alan Medlin, Selected Substantive 
Provisions of the South Carolina Probate Code: A Comparison with Previous 
South Carolina Law, 38 S.C. L. REV. 611 (1987) (discussing the substantive 
changes made to South Carolina probate law).  Under the modern Probate Code, 
the personal representative is the central figure responsible for the orderly 
management of a decedent's estate.  See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-3-701 through -721 
(Supp. 2014). The personal representative, for example, is afforded the same
standing to sue that the decedent had immediately prior to death.  S.C. Code Ann. 
81 

  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
§ 62-3-703(c) (Supp. 2014). The personal representative also may prosecute and 
defend against claims for the protection of the estate. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-
715(20) (Supp. 2014). Most importantly, for purposes of this case, the personal 
representative retains authority to compromise and settle suits for "pain and 
suffering[,] or both, and all claims and actions based on causes of actions 
surviving, to personal representatives, arising, asserted, or brought under or by 
virtue of any statute or act of this State." Id. § 62-3-715(24). The real 
representative, on the other hand, is mentioned nowhere in the modern Probate 
Code. 
Nevertheless, in the instant case, Fisher argues specific language in Duke supports 
her contention that she may bring a survival action for any cause of action as 
Shaw-Baker's real representative.  In Duke, the circuit court dismissed a 
landowner's action for damages against a telegraph company when it constructed a 
telegraph line through his land without a permit in 1903.  71 S.C. at 96–97, 50 S.E. 
at 675. The landowner died intestate that same year, leaving his wife and children 
as heirs. Id. at 97, 50 S.E. at 675. His wife and children brought a subsequent 
action against the defendant telegraph company for the construction of the 
telegraph line, and a jury returned a verdict in their favor.  Id. at 97–98, 50 S.E. at 
675–76. 
On appeal, the telegraph company argued the heirs had no standing to bring the 
action on behalf of the deceased landowner.  Id. at 98, 50 S.E. at 676. Our 
supreme court disagreed and held the heirs had a right to sue under the 
survivability statute. Id. Specifically, the court noted the following: 
[T]he right to sue is conferred by sec[tion] 2859 of the 
Code of Laws [of 1902], which provides that "causes of 
action for and in respect to any and all injuries and 
trespasses, to and upon real estate, shall survive both to 
and against the personal or real representative (as the 
case may be) of deceased persons . . . ." The heirs at law 
are the real representatives. 
Id. at 98–99, 50 S.E. at 676 (emphasis added). 
Relying upon Duke, Fisher claims she is a real representative because she is Shaw-
Baker's heir at law.  In Duke, the decedent's intestate heirs succeeding to his real 
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property brought the action for injury and trespass to his land under the 1892 Act.6
As heirs at law who succeeded to his real estate, the decedent's wife and children 
were the proper real representatives to bring a survival action on his behalf.  See 33 
C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 2 (2009). In the present case, however, 
Shaw-Baker died testate, and the probate court appointed a personal representative 
to manage the estate. As discussed above, although Fisher desires to bring 
personal causes of action on behalf of Shaw-Baker, we find these actions may only 
be properly pursued by the personal representative.  See Bennett, 97 S.C. at 29, 81 
S.E. at 189.
Based on the foregoing, we hold the circuit court properly granted Respondents'
motion for summary judgment because Fisher lacked standing to bring a survival 
action against them as Shaw-Baker's real representative.  
II. Unpreserved Issues 
Fisher argues Kouten waived the issue of standing by failing to identify himself as 
a moving party in his motion for summary judgment.  Fisher also asserts she has 
standing to bring the survival action under equitable principles of trust law.  We 
find these issues are not preserved for appellate review because they were not 
properly raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court.  See Chastain v. Hiltabidle, 
381 S.C. 508, 514–15, 673 S.E.2d 826, 829 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[A]n appellate court 
cannot address an issue unless it was raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit]
court."); Kiawah Prop. Owners Grp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 359 S.C. 105, 
113, 597 S.E.2d 145, 149 (2004) (stating a party may not raise an issue for the first 
time in a motion to reconsider, alter, or amend a judgment that could have been 
presented prior to judgment). 
III. Remaining Issues 
Because our finding that Fisher lacked standing is dispositive in this case, we 
decline to address the remaining issues on appeal.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing 
of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an 
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior 
issue is dispositive).
6 The opinion in Duke was filed only seven days after the General Assembly 
passed the 1905 amendment.  
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we hold a real representative does not have standing to 
bring personal actions on behalf of a decedent.7  Accordingly, the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents is 
AFFIRMED. 

HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur. 

7 The instant case does not present the occasion for us to determine whether a real 
representative continues to have standing to pursue a survival action based on 
trespass or injury to a decedent's real property after the enactment of the South 
Carolina Probate Code.  
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